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INTRODUCTION
Virtually no federal regulatory scheme is fully consistent
with the idealized rule of certain and predictable law; laws and
regulations inevitably both leave room for flexible interpretation
and necessarily fail to anticipate circumstances that will arise.'
As Oliver Wendell Holmes explained, "certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of mankind."2 Even where
1. 'Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal
rule ... should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable,
owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an
exact pronouncement." 3 THE PoLrIcs OF ARISTOTLE § 19, at 127 (Ernest
Barker trans., Oxford 1946), quoted in Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989).
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,466
(1897). In legal usage, repose refers to rest from legal uncertainty and potential
liability. Courts discuss repose as a central goal of our legal system, usually
mentioned along with goals of legal certainty and fair notice of legal standards
and prohibitions. It has not, however, been accorded constitutional status except as a constituent of other specified constitutional protections. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994) ("Elementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity
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federal agencies offer guidance, it is frequently tentative and
only partially binding on the government.3 Nevertheless, most
regulatory schemes with a major impact on market choices offer
means for regulated entities to discover, to at least a limited ex4
tent, their status and legal choices.
In the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA), 5 known also as the
Superfund statute, Congress created a statutory scheme unusual in the extent to which it deviates from an ideal system of
law governed by discoverable legal standards. CERCLA creates
broad potential liability for association with contaminated property and grants broad enforcement power to the government.
The statute, however, contains only general guidance regarding
what types of cleanups are legally sufficient to terminate the
risk of massive statutory liability. The statute does not mandate immediate cleanup of contaminated real property; a
cleanup is required only if so ordered by the government or a
court.
The primary goal of CERCLA is the cleanup of seriously
contaminated sites, with a slightly less central goal of imposing
cleanup costs on entities involved in, or profiting from, the activity causing the contamination (Potentially Responsible Parties,
or "PRPs") rather than on taxpayers. 6 Voluntary cleanups at
to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly

....

[Various

constitutional provisions] protect... the interests in fair notice and repose that
may be compromised by retroactive legislation. ..

."); Doggett

v. United States,

112 S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing repose as a
legal value, but rejecting repose as an independent constitutional ground to
foreclose prosecutions where Speedy Trial Act arguably not violated); United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (stating that statutes of limitations
"are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence," that they
are "statutes of repose," and that they "represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a
specified period of time"); United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385,401 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that statutes of limitations "'are vital to the
welfare of society'... because they 'promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs'") (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139
(1879)).

3. See generally MICHAEL ASmOw, ADviCE TO THE PusLic FROM FEDERAL
ADMINSTRATIVE AGENCIES (1973) (discussing various agencies' procedures for
giving advice to regulated entities).

4. See infra notes 110, 165-168 and accompanying text (discussing agency
procedures to offer guidance to regulated entities).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
6. This Article takes as a given that society has spoken through the national democratic process to state a political goal of cleanup of contaminated
property at the expense of those involved in the use of that property rather than
at the expense of taxpayers. This political choice could, and has been, criticized.
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private expense would necessarily further these goals. Nonetheless, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") steadfastly resisted, for over a decade, creating a program that would encourage voluntary private cleanups.
Although EPA recently modified its policies to encourage reuse
of abandoned industrial sites, it still resists involvement in a
comprehensive voluntary cleanup approval program. A 1993
Congressional Report criticized policies discouraging voluntary
cleanups:
Provisions in both CERCLA and RCRA [Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act]7 discourage private parties from undertaking voluntary
cleanups. Property and facility owners or operators fear that voluntary cleanup of a site will trigger a state or federal regulatory assessment, possibly resulting in listing on the [National Priorities List
("NPL)] 8 .... Private parties are hesitant to spend millions of dollars
at a waste site only to be told by EPA the work fails to meet the
[cleanup requirements dictated by the National Contingency Plan
(aNCP")]. 9
This Article, however, focuses on what has occurred under the statute and what
can be done to better achieve these two overarching statutory goals.

For a limited selection of criticisms of CERCLA, see SUPERFUND AMEND1985: SEPARATE & DIsSENmTIG VIEws, H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong.,

MENT OF

1st Sess., pt. 1, at 257 (1985) (terming cleanup efforts under CERCLA "tragically disappointing and ineffective"); Jerry L. Anderson, Removal or Remedial?
The Myth of CERCLA's Two Response System, 18 COLUM. J. EvmrL. L. 103, 10406, 122-53 (1993) (criticizing CERCLA's removal/remedial distinction); James
J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the
1980's, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 363-67, 371-76 (1986) (discussing EPA's failure
to implement CERCLA's mandates); Hubert H. Humphrey I & LeRoy Paddock, The Federal and State Roles in EnvironmentalEnforcement: A Proposal
for a More Effective and More Efficient Relationship, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 7,
34 (1990) (addressing the poor state and federal cooperation stemming from
CERCLA inadequacies); Eve L. Pouliot, Comment, Coercion vs. Cooperation:
Suggestions for the Better Effectuation of CERCLA (Superfund), 47 SMU L.
REV. 607, 615-36 (1994) (examining statutory disincentives for cleanup); John
A. Rego, Successful Superfund Reform Must Begin With Government Accountability, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July 1994, at 22 (suggesting CERCLA's inefficiency
arises from the "Superfund bureaucracy's inability, or refusal, to evaluate risk
in a meaningful manner and Congress's willingness to shield that bureaucracy's decision-making from any meaningful review"). Nonetheless, CERCLA
has had a broad and beneficial impact in deterring the creation of new contaminated sites. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (describing these
benefits).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). RCRA is also known as
the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
8. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the NPL as EPA's
list of priority sites for cleanup).
9. SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON

PUBLIC WoRKs

AND TRANSPORTATION,

ADMINISTRATION

OF THE FEDERAL

SuPERFuND PROGRAM, H.R. REP. No. 35, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1993)
[hereinafter CONG. ADMIN. REP.]; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
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Such uncertainties about the legal liabilities associated with
contaminated real property discourage private cleanup and reuse of the property.' 0
Lost opportunities to spur voluntary cleanups of the country's many contaminated sites are no small matter.1 1 Contaminated property poses risks to surrounding residents or site
workers, threatens natural resources, and harms neighboring
real property values. Moreover, such property may be unmarketable because of cautious lending practices, contributing to

U.S. CONG., STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP
REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SrrES, 1-4,
BROWNFIELDS] (stating that uncertain liabilities
AND

8 (1995) [hereinafter OTA,
hinder use and redevelopment

of former industrial sites). The NCP sets forth both the procedural and limited
substantive guidance for what must occur in connection with a cleanup of contaminated real property if the party undertaking the cleanup hopes to avoid
further liabilities or recover its costs in cost recovery or contribution actions
against other Potentially Responsible Parties ("PRPs"). See infra notes 63-68
and accompanying text (detailing the purpose and role of the NCP).
10. State common law schemes create an additional source of liability for
anyone considering cleaning up, or acquiring an interest in, contaminated real
property. Nevertheless, statute-based cleanup costs dwarf provable common
law damages from contamination in most instances. Common law liabilities
therefore remain less of a concern than massive potential statutory cleanup liabilities. This Article focuses on statutory liability.
11. As of September 1993, EPA's NPL, identifying the highest risk contaminated sites, contained 1320 sites. F NsM CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON SUPERFUND: A JOINT PROJECT OF THE KEYSTONE CENTER AND
THE ENVIRoNMENTAL LAw CENTER OF VERMoNT LAw SCHOOL 37 (1994) [hereinafter KEYSTONE REPORT]. This number is dwarfed by 10,624 sites listed on the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information System ("CERCLIS"), a database used by EPA to track sites in the
Superfund program, that await further evaluation by EPA for possible inclusion on the NPL. Id. EPA derives CERCLIS from disclosures by site owners
and operators pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c), and by using state investigations
and any other sources that EPA believes indicate a potential NPL site. That
number itself is dwarfed by the many thousands of industrial sites with levels
of contamination likely requiring cleanup, but not currently the subject of government attention; one estimate is that as many as 500,000 industrial sites
across the nation fall into this category. See Urban Land Reclamation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation of the
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 26
(1994) (testimony of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst for Economic Development of the Northeast-Mfidwest Institute); OTA, BROWNFIELDS, supra note 9,
at 4 (stating that, although the number of sites is uncertain because many are
unassessed, they number between the tens of thousands and 450,000); David
Markell, The FederalSuperfund Program:Proposalsfor Strengtheningthe Federal-StateRelationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. EVTrL. L. 1, 27 (1993) (citing Representative Michael Synar as estimating that between 130,000 and 450,000 sites
nationwide require contamination cleanup).

40
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the abandonment of "Brownfield" sites in favor of uncontami12
nated exurban "Greenfield" sites.
After exploring private incentives to undertake voluntary
cleanups, this Article examines why EPA has declined to develop a voluntary cleanup approval process under CERCLA and
the overlapping "corrective action" provisions of RCRA.1 3 In
light of these statutes' goals, such reluctance to provide guidance and repose to cleanup volunteers may seem surprising.
EPA's reluctance to expand its activities and create a voluntary
cleanup approval program runs contrary to predictions of both
New Deal theorists and law and economics scholars who, for different reasons, predict that agencies will expand their regula12. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing underutilization of "rustbelt" sites). Some CERCLA critics hypothesize that CERCLA's interminable and broad liability scheme has created substantial societally-borne
external costs in the form of underutilized "rustbelt" industrial real property
and lost employment opportunities in impoverished inner city areas. These
critics call for modification of current policy based on posited external impacts
of regulatory uncertainty. Other critics, examining the pervasive uncertainty
under CERCLA caused by limitations of science, technology, and administrative and statutory policy, conclude, as does this Article, that while uncertainty
may play a contributing role in the underutilization of old industrial properties,
ascribing a causal relationship between the two is unwarranted. These latter
critics of current policy correctly conclude, however, that uncertainty at least
incrementally contributes to incentives to turn away from rustbelt industrial
properties and instead utilize exurban "Greenfield" sites. See CONG. ADMIN.
REP., supra note 9, at 8-10, 88-95 (discussing impact of statutory uncertainty);
OTA, BROWNFiELDS, supra note 9, at 12, 4-5 (stating that uncertain environmental liabilities contribute to abandonment of contaminated sites, but that
other factors also contribute to Brownfields phenomenon); NORTHEAST-IDWEST
INSTITUTE, NEW LrFE FOR OLD BUILDINGS: CONFRONTING ENVmONMENrAL AND

ECONOMIC ISSUES FOR INDUSTRIAL REUSE, 1, 4 (1991) [hereinafter NEw LIFE]
(discussing impact of statutory uncertainty); James T. O'Reilly, Environmental
Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner City Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-FillIncentives,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 50-54 (1994) (same); RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, The

Impact of UncertainEnvironmentalLiabilityon IndustrialRealEstate Development: Developing a Framework for Analysis, Discussion Paper 94-03, at 21
nn.25-27 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter IndustrialDevelopment] (same).
13. This Article generally will use the term "cleanup" to describe what environmental scientists, lawyers, and officials frequently call response actions.
In fact, CERCLA distinguishes between response actions involving "removal"
and "remediation." "Removal" generally refers to the removal of contaminants,
containers, and other easily removed sources of contamination on the surface of
the ground. CERCLA defines "remediation" as the long-term alleviation of contamination to make the site permanently clean. RCRA refers to contamination
cleanups as "corrective actions." 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1988). This Article uses
the term "cleanup" to refer to any type of response or corrective action because
its common meaning is more descriptive and is not an environmental term of
art. See generally Anderson, supra note 6, at 104-06, 122-53 (criticizing CERCLA's distinction between removal and remediation).
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tory domain, particularly where such expansion would further
statutory goals or please a regulated constituency. EPA's conduct under CERCLA and RCRA calls into question the prevalent
view that agencies always regulate too much and grow too
large.' 4 Here, despite its residual policymaking discretion and
statutory authority, EPA avoided an opportunity to expand by
creating a process to give cleanup volunteers feedback 1 5 about
the sufficiency of their cleanup plans. Statutory instructions
and predictable bureaucratic tendencies, however, make EPA's
reluctance understandable. Congress failed to anticipate regulators' and regulated entities' preferences and incentives and
harness or control them to further the statutory goals of CERCLA and related sections of RCRA.16 In contrast to federal legislative and bureaucratic dynamics, different political pressures
and rewards affecting local governments explain new state voluntary cleanup approval programs, most of which were initiated
following recently defeated attempts to amend CERCLA.
This Article explores private and government incentives to
become involved in private voluntary cleanups and proposes
that either EPA or the political branches create a "Cleanup Approval Process" ("CAP"). This CAP scheme would be instituted
primarily by delegating authority to states, but with ongoing
federal oversight and available federal review of disputed
14. Counsel for the new Republican majority of the Congressional Committee on Commerce recently made just this assertion in defending "regulatory reform" legislative proposals. Nandan Kenkeremath, Statement at Inside EPA
Conference, "Rethinking Environmental Regulation" (May 15, 1995) (notes on
file with author). Kenkeremath stated that "bureaucrats simply want to expand." Id.; see also infra notes 159-160, 162-170, 173-174, 197 and accompanying text (discussing "budgetary expansion" hypothesis).
15. This Article uses the term "feedback" to refer to a mechanism by which
regulated entities have recourse to codified law or an individualized (or adjudicatory) process in which the government provides legal guidance to a regulated
entity. See infra notes 110, 165-168 and accompanying text (discussing individual guidance to regulated entities provided by federal regulatory agencies).
16. As discussed in greater depth infra note 171, the term "preferences"
refers generally to an individual's innate interests and desires, or an individual's personal calculus of costs and benefits. The term "incentives" generally
refers to externally imposed or created pressures that modify an individual's
innate assessment of costs and benefits of particular actions. The distinction
between "preferences" and "incentives" is frequently unclear. The term "control" refers to the need to constrain an actor who would otherwise deviate from
statutory goals, while "harness" refers to the need to take advantage of preferences or incentives of regulated entities or actors where those motivations further statutory goals. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60 (arguing that
failure to anticipate preferences and incentives of regulators will frustrate statutory goals).
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cleanup approvals. Part I demonstrates that, because of the
broad liability schemes of CERCLA and RCRA, lenders, municipalities, and private parties have powerful incentives to ascertain and limit the extent of their liabilities by engaging in
voluntary cleanups. This section shows how private parties, at
the moment of a transaction involving real property, would have
heightened abilities and incentives to undertake voluntary contamination cleanups if finality and repose for cleanup volunteers
were possible. Part H discusses federal statutory and regulatory
policy and explores why current statutes discourage cleanup volunteers and discourage EPA creation of a voluntary cleanup approval process. Part H also criticizes current policy on
jurisprudential grounds. Part Im proposes the CAP scheme, reviews recent state and federal initiatives to encourage voluntary
cleanups, and recommends a division of implementation responsibilities between state and federal officials. Part I also shows
how recent state and federal initiatives confirm that to draft effective legislation or regulations, legislators or administrators
must anticipate the preferences and incentives of impacted individuals and institutions.
I. THE MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO HARNESS
VOLUNTARY CLEANUP INCENTIVES
In enacting CERCLA and RCRA, Congress failed to harness
the dynamics of lending relationships, municipal redevelopment
goals, and private real property transactions to increase the
likelihood of voluntary cleanups. Instead, by creating potentially interminable liabilities without providing any procedure
for approval of voluntary cleanups, these schemes actually discourage voluntary cleanups.

A. A CERCLA Li&aiuTy PRIMER
CERCLA was signed into law in 1980 following public outcry over the Love Canal contamination problem in upstate New
York.1 7 Since its enactment, especially following its amendment
17.

ASKING

See MARc K LNy ET AL., THE EmiomENTA PROTECTION AGENCY:
THE WRONG QUESTIONS 133-42 (1990) (discussing Love Canal

furor as

impetus for CERCLA's passage but questioning the rationale and soundness of
CERCLA); Markell, supra note 11, at 1, 7-11 (discussing the political climate
and events surrounding the passage of the original Superfimd legislation). A
gap in the federal statutory scheme gave the government few dollars and little
statutory authority for dealing with abandoned hazardous substance waste disposal sites, particularly in emergency situations. CERCLA was initially colloquially referred to as the Superfand statute because of the name of the fund
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through the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of
1986 ("SARA"), the broad liability language in section 9607(a) of
the statute has become the heart of CERCLA.18 A series of court
decisions in the 1980s held that, through this section, CERCLA
imposes strict, joint, and several liability on virtually any entity
associated with a contaminated property.1 9 PRPs associated
with a facility where hazardous substances have been "deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located"20 are potentially liable to the government for "all costs of
removal or remedial action" incurred by the government or "any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person"
21
consistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").
While CERCLA does not mandate immediate cleanup of contaminated sites, its liability scheme makes a broad category of entities vulnerable to cleanup liabilities.
Liability under CERCLA is retroactive. 2 2 Because liability
is determined by the contaminated state of the relevant parcel of
created to finance government-directed cleanup of the most seriously contaminated sites. See generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse Compensationand Liability ("Superfund")Act
of 1980, 8 COLUm. J. ENwrL. L. 1 (1982) (discussing the legislative history of
CERCLA).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
19. E.g. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726, 737-46 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also
Stephen Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertaintyin the Age of Superfund:A Critique
of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 36, 46-50
(1994) (discussing CERCLA sections 107 and 113 and their imposition of joint
and several liability on PRPs).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). While Judge Skelly Wright advocated
an expansion of due process jurisprudence to create a constitutional right to
"have one's conduct governed by rules which are stated in advance," J. Skelly
Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 588 (1972), such an
expansion of due process doctrine has not occurred. Battles over the constitutionality of CERCLA have waged, yet it stands intact except for a few minor
successful regulatory challenges. See Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. United
States, 927 F.2d 289, 296 (6th Cir. 1991) (CERCLA's provision barring judicial
review prior to an EPA enforcement action does not violate due process); United
States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding CERCLA's contribution protection to settling defendants "substantially fair"); O'Neil
v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 183 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding CERCLA's retroactive application constitutional), cert. denied sub nom. American Cyanamid Co. v.
O'Neil, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 17475 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding CERCA's imposition of retroactive, strict, joint
and several liability), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Union
Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1356-57 (3rd Cir. 1987) (holding that Congress has the
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real property and because the federal government generally refuses ever to declare a potentially liable party released from liability, 23 potential liability under CERCLA is also eternal. 24 The
following categories of private parties face liability as PRPs
where hazardous substances have been or may be released from
a facility or site: current owners or operators; past owners or operators at the time of hazardous substance disposal; generators
of hazardous substances; transporters of hazardous substances
who select waste disposal sites; and anyone accepting hazardous
substances for disposal. 2 5 More attenuated categories of PRPs,
such as past owners during a time when contaminants migrated
or leaked and corporate affiliates,
have also been found poten26
tially liable under CERCLA.
constitutional power to abrogate the states' 11th Amendment immunity in
Superfund suits), aff'd sub noma. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986) (retroactive application of CERCLA does not constitute unconstitutional taking of property), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Wagner
Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that CERCLA's
provision authorizing fines, including treble damages, for willing violators does
not violate due process); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp.
531, 539 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding CERCLA not void for vagueness, because it
provides "fair notice of what is required and forbidden" and because the Constitution tolerates some vagueness where public safety is involved), modified on
other grounds, 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993). But see Reardon v. United States,
947 F.2d 1509, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding EPA's implementation of
CERCLA's lien provision violates due process by failing to provide notice and a
pre-deprivation hearing to property owners); Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA,
812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that CERCLA's treble damages provision violates due process if the party opposing such damages had an objectively reasonable belief that EPA's cleanup order was invalid or inapplicable).
23. See Frederick Addison I, Reopener Liability Under Section 122 of
CERCLA: "FromHere to Eternity," 45 Sw. L.J. 1081, 1086-97 (1991) (discussing
how EPA settlement policy creates eternal liability).
24. The one exception is explicit authorization for EPA to give "de minimis"
PRPs complete repose and finality when entering into consent decrees with
EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(2) (1988); see infra notes 80-88 and accompanying
text (exploring broad reopeners to CERCLA consent decrees); infra notes 120155 (analyzing EPA's resistance to providing repose under existing statutory
schemes).
25. See WILLiAm H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONmENTAL LAw §§ 8.6-8.7, at 76783 (1994) (discussing interpretations of "release" language and discussing categories of PRPs).
26. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hopper & Sons Co. 966 F.2d 837,846 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding that CERCLA imposes liability on passive owners for gradual leaking of contaminants during their period of ownership), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 377 (1992); Portsmouth Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. BMI Apartments Assocs., 827 F. Supp. 354, 358 (E.D. Va. 1993) (same); Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-N-Go
Foods, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (same); see generally
Henry L. Stephens Jr., When is "Leaching"Not"Leaking:" CERCLA Liability of
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This Article primarily addresses the potential liabilities associated with the many thousands of contaminated industrial
sites that have not been placed on the NPL, EPA's list of priority
cleanup sites. 27 Any owner of contaminated property, even if
the property is not on the NPL, is potentially liable for cleanup
costs under both CERCLA and RCRA, 28 as is any past owner
who disposed of any wastes or owned the property while con-

Owners and Operatorsat the Time of Disposal,24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,177, 10,179
(1994) (discussing liability associated with passive "disposal"); Kurt Strasser &
Denise Rodosevich, Seeing the Forest for the Trees in CERCLA Liability, 10
YALE L.J. ON REG. 493 (1993) (arguing that cases expanding categories of CERCLA liability are joined by consistent underlying principles); Erika C. Birg,
Comment, Redefining "Ownerand Operator"Under CERCLA to PressureTraditional Notions of CorporateLaw, 43 EMORY L.J. 771 (1994) (critiquing case law
expanding categories of "owner or operator" liability); Lisa A. Lee, Note, Guilty
for Having Done Nothing: Passive PastOwners Face CERCLA Liability, 1 Mo.
ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y REV. 88, 89 (1993) (discussing liability associated with passive "disposal").
27. EPA now devotes most of its CERCLA resources to the most serious
known sites of contamination. Those sites are placed on the National Priorities
List ("NPL"), an annually updated listing by EPA of contaminated sites assessed through a hazard ranking process as posing the highest risk to health
and the environment. See, e.g., KATHERmNE N. PROBST ET AL., FOOTING THE BILL
FOR THE SUPERFUND CLEANUPS 4 (1995) (detailing EPA's use of the NPL). The
NPL is created through a notice and comment administrative process in which
EPA gives a numerical hazard ranking to contaminated sites. CONG. ADMIN.
REP., supra note 9, at 24. Once EPA has placed a site on the NPL or initiated
cleanup activities at a site, some of the problems of uncertainty disappear.
Even where EPA initiates action, however, consent decrees generally have
broad reopener provisions. See infra notes 80-88, (discussing the logistics of
reopener provisions), and notes 120-155 and accompanying text (discussing the
interplay between consent decrees and EPA response to voluntary cleanup efforts). This uncertainty is slight, however, compared to that associated with the
far more numerous contaminated industrial sites not currently on the NPL.
For such sites, the statute provides no mechanism by which cleanup volunteers
can determine their status or what type of cleanup would be legally sufficient to
eliminate liability. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (describing 42
U.S.C. § 9622(a) and the statutory presumption in favor of reopeners). As EPA
over time supervises or undertakes cleanups at the most contaminated sites,
less contaminated sites will be considered for addition to the NPL. See PROBST,
supra, at 19-20 (stating that EPA expected to add 75 new cites per year to the
NPL). The current hazard ranking that places a site on the NPL was chosen by

EPA and can be modified. See

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMING
CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED 116 (1989) [hereinafter COMING
CLEAN] (briefly describing the ranking structure of the NPL).

28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988) (CERCLA liability provision); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6973 (1988) (RCRA provision authorizing EPA enforcement action against
contributors to hazardous waste disposal posing threat to environment or
health); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1988) (RCRA provision authorizing EPA to penalize any party failing to comply with a corrective action order).
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taminants leaked or migrated. 2 9 As with many "rustbelt"
sites,3 0 such industrial property is frequently either unused or
underutilized. 3 1 A firm fix on what would be considered a sufficient cleanup is virtually impossible, however, without a site29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the liability of
passive owners and corporate affiliates). Other provisions relate to PRPs' liabilities but are less relevant to the problems confronted by cleanup volunteers.
For example, CERCLA mandates reporting of unpermitted releases above
specified quantities of listed hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1988).
This release reporting requirement, which subjects anyone failing to report a
release to substantial criminal and civil penalties, is intended both to deter releases and to facilitate effective and prompt responses when hazardous substances are released. RODGERS, supra note 25, at 687; see also Grad, supra note
17, at 32 (discussing House debate over the reporting requirement). CERCLA
also mandates disclosure of inactive waste disposal sites that someone creates
or discovers. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1988). In addition, an owner of contaminated
real property who knows of site contamination but fails to disclose that knowledge to a buyer of the property remains liable as though a current owner of the
contaminated parcel. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988). Again, the statute does
not mandate immediate cleanup of contaminated real property by private parties. A cleanup is required only if EPA or a court so orders.
30. "Rustbelt" sites are older industrial sites in states and regions that in
the past had concentrated industrial activity; most such sites are in the Northeastern and Great Lakes states. JoHN A. JAKLE & DAVID WILSON, DERELICT
LANDSCAPES 57-92 (1992).

31. The concept of property "underutilization" is inevitably somewhat
amorphous. By the term, I refer to a building or land parcel (hereinafter the
"industrial facility" or simply the "facility") that was once used intensively for
manufacturing operations and that has infrastructure resources and a location
now used in a less intensive manner. Examples of such facilities include former
manufacturing facilities now used only for storage, sites having rail access that
currently make no use of railroad transportation, sites employing few or no employees but that are surrounded by residential communities with an available
labor pool, and former industrial facilities that are completely unused.
A recent survey of NPL sites found that a plurality of these most contaminated sites are industrial or former industrial facilities where the class of PRPs
numbers fewer than 10. See PROBST, supra note 27, at 35, 38 (examining 1134
NPL sites and finding that a plurality of 38% of the sites are industrial facilities
and finding that 59% of the sites involve 10 or fewer PRPs). Non-NPL sites
with contamination problems are even more likely to be industrial sites with
few PRPs. Katherine N. Probst, Remarks at New York University Conference
on Superfund Reauthorization: Theoretical and Empirical Issues (Dec. 3-4,
1993) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter NYU Conf.]. Such a conclusion
about the composition of non-NPL sites necessarily is somewhat tentative since
such sites, by definition, will generally be sites that have been less scrutinized
than NPL sites. This conclusion is likely, however, because the first generation
of NPL sites were the readily identifiable landfills, illegal dumpsites, and
grossly contaminated industrial sites. Far more industrial and formerly industrial facilities remain untested and unclassified by the government. Virtually
all industrial facilities have some degree of contamination. See NEw LIFE,
supra note 12, at 1, 4-6 (asserting that contamination of varying levels is endemic to industrial sites); O'Reilly, supranote 12, at 43, 50-54 (discussing widespread contamination of industrial sites). The vastly greater number of non-
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specific evaluation by government officials; CERCLA cleanup
standards in application are highly variable and subject to dis2
cretionary judgments, and thus yield unpredictable results.3
Without government feedback about the type and extent of necessary cleanup, efforts to determine liabilities associated with
contaminated land are fraught with uncertainty.

B.

PmiVATE CLEANUP INCENTIVES

Because CERCLA's, and to a lesser extent RCRA's, broad
potential liabilities are unlimited by time, degree of culpability
or causation of actual harm, entities falling into a PRP category
or considering involvement with a contaminated site have powerful incentives to seek a certain and final resolution to their
cleanup liabilities. These incentives exist even at sites requiring
substantial cleanup. 33 CERCLA and RCRA should harness
transactional incentives by creating a CAP feedback mechanism
to provide possible cleanup volunteers with certainty and repose. Such a scheme would not only encourage cleanups at private expense, but would also provide substantial external
benefits by decreasing incentives to abandon old industrial
sites.3 4 For over a decade, however, neither the federal political
NPL sites are similarly likely to be predominately composed of industrial sites
with fewer than 10 PRPs.
32. See CONG. ADMIN. REP., supra note 9, at 8-10, 88-95 (discussing
problems of inconsistent levels of cleanup at various sites); OTA, BROWNFIELDS,
supra note 9, at 2-3, 6 (same); Industrial Development, supra note 12, at 12
(same); see also infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text (discussing varying
standards of compliance with the NCP); see generally NEW LIFE, supra note 12,
at 1, 4 (surveying cleanup costs); O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 50-54 (discussing
uncertainties inherent in cleanup cost assessments).
33. With cleanup costs regularly running in the multi-million dollar range,
many contaminated parcels standing alone have a negative value. If they are
part of a larger multi-asset transaction or if a particular property's location or
resources are valued by a particular buyer, however, that buyer might be willing to acquire a contaminated property if seller and buyer could determine their
relative liabilities. A sale of a single parcel with a negative value is even possible where a buyer could more cost-effectively clean up contamination than could
the seller. In such a transaction, seller would pay buyer to acquire the interest
in the contaminated site. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
34. The benefits are "external" in the sense that a voluntary cleanup could
create benefits "external" to the private decisionmakers' personal value assessments. A decision to keep a factory in use might ensure the viability of a neighborhood, lead to increased employment, and provide additional tax base. NEW
LIFE, supra note 12, at 1, 4; IndustrialDevelopment, supra note 12, at 21; see
generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Amf. EcON.
REV. 347 (1967) (discussing externalities and the need for certain property
rights).
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branches nor EPA created any
program or policy to review and
85
approve voluntary cleanups.
Political and market developments reveal substantial interest in voluntary cleanup approvals. Industry representatives
36
advocate the creation of voluntary cleanup approval programs.
In addition, in those states that have just started to provide
cleanup approvals and substantial repose from possible state enforcement, at least one company, perceiving a new market niche,
acquires contaminated sites, secures cleanup approvals, and
then markets the remediated site.3 7 Furthermore, the substantial political support for state voluntary cleanup programs indicates the presence of constituencies interested in such
cleanups.38 The remainder of this section describes why private
parties would likely undertake voluntary cleanups were government approval available. This section describes and analyzes
the transactional dynamics likely to create special incentives for
private voluntary cleanups.
Commercial lenders or investment syndicates frequently require an environmental assessment and cleanup activities to re39
duce future liabilities associated with contaminated property.
35. EPA has recently indicated, during the Spring of 1995, a new willingness to review proposals of prospective purchasers. Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of
Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed.
Reg. 34,792, 34,793 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Guidance]. In addition, numerous
states have recently enacted schemes to review and approve cleanups of smaller
contaminated sites, but those approvals (where available) lack federal statutory
authority, do not preempt federal action, and in some instances are only available to a limited subset of cleanup volunteers. See infra notes 250-265 and accompanying text and Appendix A (discussing such state initiatives).
36. Mark Anderson, Editor of The Greenfields Report, Comments at the
1995 University of Georgia Red Clay Conference (Mar. 11, 1995) (stating that
state programs are a step in the right direction, but that a federal signoff is
needed to reduce disincentives to private cleanups); Daniel Riesel, Esq., Comments at 1995 Winter Meeting of N.Y. State Bar Environmental Section, Panel
on Hazardous Waste Issues (1995).
37. Telephone interview with Kevin Bowles of Cherokee Industries, LLC
(June, 1995) [hereinafter Bowles Interview]; Ann Marie Stack, Esq., Comments
at the 1995 University of Georgia Red Clay Conference (Mar. 11, 1995).
38. Entities involved in contaminated real property provide the most likely
constituency, but state officials fearing loss of business to jurisdictions offering
greater regulatory certainty are also likely supporters of such programs. Interviews conducted by the author with various state officials confirmed that the
political advocates for state voluntary cleanup approval initiatives have been
state officials, their agencies, and private entities potentially involved with contaminated property. See infra Appendix A (surveying state cleanup programs).
39. Macoln D. Griggs, Lender Liability and EnvironmentalRisk Management, 67 FLA. B.J. 80 (Dec. 1993); Laura E. Peck, Viable ProtectionMechanisms
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Similarly, risk-averse investors may avoid a site based on exaggerated appraisals of cleanup costs. Were prior government
approval available, lenders or investors could rationally decide
whether the relevant industrial facility is a prudent
40
investment.
Municipalities also desire accurate cleanup cost appraisals. 4 1 Municipalities have incentives to encourage, through financing or special legislative action, private reuse of
underutilized properties to maximize tax revenues and employment. Public-private corporations are frequently the vehicle by
which such industrial sites are prepared for complete privatization and proposed reuse. 42 Contamination cleanup by such corporations might precede private development, although a city
might instead offer administrative assistance for private
cleanup activities. Without certainty that federal and state authorities would find a proposed cleanup sufficient, private parties are leery of participating in municipal efforts to encourage
43
industrial reuse.
for Lenders Against Hazardous Waste Liability, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 89, 106
(1989); Roger D. Staton, EPA's FinalRule on Lender Liability: Lenders Beware,
49 Bus. LAw. 163, 172-73 (1993); Jo Ann Shotwell, LenderLiability in the Wake

of Kelly v. EPA, MASS. L. WKLY., Apr. 25, 1994, at S3.
40. See Gail S. Port, EnvironmentalLaw Liability Issues, in ENvmoNIENTAL

LAW UPDATE 1993, at 11 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook

Series No. 474, 1993) (discussing cleanup costs); Craig J. Reece, Trustees and
Secured Lenders as Owners or Operators Under CERCLA, in ENvmoNArmrrA
LAw UPDATE 1993, at 551 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 474, 1993) (same).
41. JAHLE & WILSON, supra note 30, at 104-08; see generally Symposium,
Revitalizing the Industrial City, 488 ANNAs Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCo.9
(1986) (discussing efforts to revitalize decaying American cities).
42. See CHARLES HAAR & MICHAEL WOLF, LAND USE PLANNnG: A
CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND REUSE OF URBAN LAND 925-29, 964, 1005
(1989) (detailing the "evolution and evaluation of public-private partnerships");
NEw LIFE, supra note 12, at 41-60 (discussing the public-private nature of many
cleanup programs).
43. Another context in which a private entity may wish to ascertain the
extent of its liabilities, if any, is where insurance funds may be available. Government approval of a proposal coupled with a private commitment under
threat of government sanction to undertake a cleanup may make insurance
funds available, or at least give rise to a colorable claim. The decreased availability of insurance for environmental concerns, however, makes this situation
less and less likely. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation
and InternationalCompetitiveness, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2083 (1993) (stating the
"threat of uncertain and potentially enormous liability awards in the United
States has made insurers unwilling to provide any coverage at all for such
liabilities").
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The following scenario develops the thesis that private parties have heightened incentives in the transactional context to
agree to voluntary cleanups, provided those cleanups were approved and final. Seller owns a factory ("Factory") with an old
chemical waste disposal site in the woods behind Factory.
Buyer is interested in Factory, and already has Lender and Investor lined up to support a prudent acquisition of the property.
Buyer seeks to determine the true value of the real property
asset, which inevitably requires assessing its degree of contamination. Once Buyer investigates an asset and evaluates its
worth, then Seller has incentives to determine the site's value,
taking into account its associated environmental risks. 44 In the
absence of such information, Seller would be at a disadvantage
in transactional negotiations. So ultimately, Buyer and Seller,
and possibly Lender or Investor as well, will seek to ascertain
the true value of a site.
If the sale of Factory would benefit both Seller and Buyer
but is avoided because Buyer overestimates or Seller underestimates cleanup costs, Buyer, Seller, Investor and Lender all lose.
If one accepts the classical economics tenet that a consensual
market transaction, based on accurate information, benefits
both the market actors and society as a whole by reallocating
market resources to higher and better uses, then a transaction
45
avoided because of erroneous information hurts everyone.
Under the current federal hazardous substance schemes, in
particular CERCLA, the government and the statutory liability
scheme are the cause of market imperfection. Without government involvement in assessing what will suffice to clean up Factory, Buyer and Seller can only estimate prospective value and
prospective cost; even the best lawyers and consultants cannot
tell them what cleanup plans would legally suffice.4 6 As Profes44. See Roger B. Myerson, Analysis of Incentives in Bargainingand Mediation, in NEGOTIATION ANALYsIs, 67, 70-79 (H. Peyton Young ed., 1991) (discussing negotiation and bargaining incentives and dynamics under circumstances of
unequal distribution of information).
45. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Negotiator Rationality
and NegotiatorCognition: The InteractiveRoles of Prescriptiveand Descriptive
Research, in NEGOTIATION ANALYsis 109, 111-22 (H. Peter Young ed., 1991)
(describing the role of information in negotiation strategy); Ronald Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1, 40 (1960) ("[A] pricing system...
leads to the employment of factors in places where the value of the product
yielded is greatest.").
46. Under the current CERCLA and RCRA schemes, statutory or regulatory guidance on "how clean is clean" unavoidably leaves substantial uncertainty about what type and extent of cleanup would suffice. See discussion
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sor George Stigler established, acquisition of accurate information is both costly and essential for markets to function.4 7 Here,
such information cannot be obtained in the absence of a CAPlike scheme providing government review and approval of
48
cleanup plans.
Without a CAP scheme's finality, Seller has strong incentives not to undertake its own cleanup; uncertainties in recouping cleanup costs and the possibility that additional cleanup
might later be required discourage cleanup. 4 9 Buyer may decide
that the risk of an expensive cleanup weighs against acquisition
of a contaminated site. Under the current CERCLA and RCRA
schemes, some transactions will correctly be avoided, but others
50
that should occur will not.
In addition, if a transaction were consummated despite the
liability uncertainties caused by the lack of any approval process, Seller and Buyer would continue to reserve funds to cover
contingent statutory liabilities, diverting those funds from
higher and better uses. Both Seller and Buyer would lack repose under the current legal scheme. Future efforts to market
or finance the contaminated land would still be hindered. Unavoidable potential liability would remain.
Now, consider the same Factory scenario under a revised
RCRA or CERCLA with a CAP-like scheme offering government
supra note 32 and infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (detailing limitations of such guidance). The uncertainty problem extends beyond scientific uncertainty. Legal judgment calls are unavoidable under CERCLA and RCRA.
Only a government decision regarding the sufficiency of a cleanup plan can
eliminate cleanup uncertainty currently borne by PRPs. See infra note 66 and
accompanying text (surveying cases showing substantial deference to EPA
cleanup decisions).
47. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213
(1961).
48. Professor Ronald Gilson added to Stigler's insights by showing how
business attorneys add value to a transaction by allowing that transaction to
occur in circumstances closer to those of an ideal market, by reducing uncertainties and thus improving the quality of transactional information. Ronald J.
Gilson, Value Creationby BusinessLawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94
YALE L.J. 239 (1984). Environmental attorneys' practice of auditing real property in a transactional context supports Gilson's insights. The lawyer's essential task in an audit is to gain a more accurate understanding of real property
conditions. See Michael Herz, Environmental Auditing and Environmental
Management: The Implicit and Explicit FederalRegulatory Mandate, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1241 (1991) (asserting that companies will not flourish under federal environmental regulatory schemes without comprehensive information
gathering systems).
49. CONG. ADMN. REP., supra note 9, at 38-39; OTA, BROWNFIELDS, supra
note 9, at 2-3, 4, 6-7.
50. IndustrialDevelopment, supra note 12, at 3, 18, 31.
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feedback and approval of cleanup plans or binding government
statements of no interest in a site or a party associated with the
site. In this scenario, Buyer and Seller have the option of ignoring contamination risks, evaluating them on their own without
government involvement and either undertaking or avoiding a
cleanup, or seeking government review of cleanup plans. Following government review, the parties could either engage in a
cleanup or decide against cleanup. 5 1 Assume that cleanup costs
will fall somewhere between $1 million and $5 million. 52 Depending on the dynamics of negotiations, the parties might or
might not reach an agreement. Assume further that the government would approve a cleanup costing $2 million and the parties
could utilize a CAP scheme to ascertain this information. This
information might make the transaction attractive or unattractive to Buyer, who could always choose another site, or might
lead Buyer to offer a price viewed as unduly low by Seller. For
the following reasons, however, at the moment of a transaction,
the parties would have greater motivations, or at least increased
financial capabilities, to commit to a cleanup than they would
have at any other time.
From Seller's perspective, prior to any transaction, a
cleanup would be a cash drain without any concurrent influx of
cash. Similarly, where the process of assessing environmental
risk and planning a cleanup may itself cost millions, utilization
of the CAP scheme might also be avoided in the absence of a
cash influx. Unless Seller had reason to believe that a contaminated site was dispersing or leaching contaminants and thus increasing unavoidable future cleanup costs, Seller would
probably decide not to clean up or even investigate property
conditions to determine the presence or extent of any
contamination.
51. An alternative scheme could require parties to undertake cleanup
plans once government guidance was sought, but such a cleanup mandate
might discourage parties from considering voluntary cleanups. As does New
Jersey under its Memorandum of Agreement policy, this Article rejects a
cleanup mandate for parties seeking government cleanup guidance or approval
for this very reason. See infra notes 254-257 and accompanying text (detailing
New Jersey's initiative whereby volunteers can receive protection and official
guidance without a cleanup mandate once that guidance is sought). Nevertheless, government scrutiny under such a process would alert government authorities to contamination problems. Participation in an aborted voluntary cleanup
approval process would not provide amnesty to the volunteer.
52. Given an average NPL site cleanup cost of $30 million to $40 million,
the $1 million to $5 million range for non-NPL industrial sites may be low.
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Once an interested Buyer appears, Seller's incentives
change. An influx of cash from a sale of Factory and other assets
could fund cleanup assessments, plans and actual cleanup activities. Seller would like to discharge uncertain liabilities associated with the property were it to remain contaminated. Seller
would also fear future blame for contamination caused by Buyer
but imposable on Seller under CERCLA's strict, joint, several,
retroactive and eternal liability scheme. Seller would thus have
powerful incentives to utilize a CAP scheme to fix its liabilities.
The price to be paid for the asset would be adjusted to reflect
cleanup costs, and Seller would remain interested in the
transaction.
The only circumstance in which Seller might seek to avoid
the CAP scheme is if Seller thought it might succeed in selling a
contaminated site under the false pretense that it was clean, or
based on wishful thinking that an unaudited site was clean.
Buyer's, Lender's, and Investor's incentives make it unlikely
53
that such strategic behavior by Seller would succeed.
Buyer also would have strong incentives to utilize the CAP
scheme. Buyer does not want to overpay for the property, and a
CAP scheme would offer an accurate assessment of contamination costs associated with a site. A CAP scheme would also allow Buyer to avoid the risk of liability for contamination
preexisting Buyer's ownership of Factory. If Buyer were still interested once cleanup costs were known, then Buyer and Seller
would negotiate an appropriate setoff or reduction in price and
proceed with the transaction.5 4 Buyer and Seller might even
agree to a transaction in which Seller paid Buyer to acquire and
clean up a contaminated site.5 5 If Buyer were confronted by a
Seller reluctant to engage in the CAP scheme or to allow or undertake environmental audits of Factory, a prudent Buyer
53. In addition to the reasons set forth below why strategic nondisclosure
would likely fail, negotiating parties may act against immediate self interest
even where economic benefits to such behavior may not be apparent. See RoBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WrrnIN REASON ix-x, 51, 67-69, 258 (1988) (exploring
why individuals may take actions against their apparent self-interest). Furthermore, a seller's failure to disclose contamination of which he has knowledge
allows the government to continue to treat the seller as a current owner of the
property. See supra note 29 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(c) (1988)).
54. Buyer would still bear the risk associated with any contamination
Buyer might cause in the future. Buyer would also bear some residual risk that
in the event of a future contamination spill, Buyer might have to clean up the
spill along with any contamination possibly left after the CAP cleanup.
55. At least one market transaction was almost consummated in which a
buyer would be paid by a seller to assume responsibility for ownership and
cleanup of a contaminated site. Bowles interview, supra note 37.
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would become more insistent on environmental auditing and use
of the CAP scheme. Unless Factory were a "must" purchase for
Buyer, neither Buyer, Lender, nor Investor would even consider
Buyer's acquisition of such real property with a possible contamination problem of uncertain magnitude. A rational Seller
would capitulate and utilize the CAP scheme unless Seller had
reason to believe that contamination was so substantial that an
informed Buyer would definitely avoid the transaction.
Under CERCLA's and, to a lesser extent, RCRA's liability
schemes, as augmented by a CAP scheme, market incentives
thus would provide substantial motivation for cleanup volunteers to seek CAP approvals. Without any expenditure of
Superfund dollars and with limited government administrative
expenses, actual cleanups of contaminated real property would
occur. 56 Recent industry calls for voluntary cleanup approvals,

along with new private cleanup schemes under state laws offering approvals and repose, indicate that such cleanups are not
just a theoretical possibility. 57 Furthermore, as shown in Appendix A, a survey of states offering voluntary cleanup approvals reveals that most such voluntary cleanups occur in the
transactional context. Given that cleanups of contaminated
sites at PRP expense are the paramount goals of CERCLA and
RCRA's corrective action program, the question is why neither
the federal political branches nor EPA created a voluntary
cleanup approval policy or program. The following sections explore this question and further discuss the desirable elements of
a CAP scheme.
II. EXPLORING WHY NO FEDERAL VOLUNTARY
CLEANUP APPROVAL PROCESS EXISTS
Current federal regulatory schemes pertaining to hazardous
waste contamination fail to encourage voluntary cleanups because of the particular instructions and mandates the political
branches articulated in CERCLA and RCRA, and because bureaucratic preferences and incentives run, in part, counter to the
statutes' goals of cleanups at PRP expense. As political scien56. Under the proposed CAP scheme, administrative expenses would be
offset by an application fee or would be paid directly by applicants. See infra
notes 224-234 & 286 and accompanying text (presenting the CAP scheme). It is
likely, however, that some net drain on agency budgets would still occur from
the expenses incurred in creating a new office to administer a CAP scheme and
from responding to any third-party challenges to CAP approvals.
57. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (presenting comments on
need for voluntary cleanup programs).
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55

tists, economists, and public choice scholars have argued,5 8 legislators must consider the particular cost-benefit calculus of
private and government officials in designing a political solution
to a problem.5 9 This Article starts with a political choice or
58. The phrase "public choice" has been given a number of meanings. Its
basic definition is the application of the tools of economic analysis to the study
of political behavior. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHiLU P. FICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRIcAL IN rOUcTioN 1, 7 (1991) (citing D. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE l 1 (1989)) (defining public choice scholarship as "the economic study of

non-market decision making, or simply the application of economics to political
science"). Public choice scholars frequently examine the failings of political systems or political choices, advocating that before the political system is turned to
as the solution to apparent market failings or flaws, the political system's weaknesses should also be analyzed and acknowledged. See infra notes 158-160,
162-164 (presenting public choice "budgetarty expansion" hypothesis). Ronald
Coase presented one of the earliest statements of the idea that market and
political institutions must be compared in solving problems. Coase, supra note
45, at 20. Coase stated:
[Tihe problem is one of choosing the appropriate social arrangement
for dealing with the harmful effects .... iThere is no reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm. Satisfactory views
on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the
market, firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects.
Id.
59. This Article's perspective differs from the focus of the public choice
school because it does not weigh the relative merits of political or market systems, but rather utilizes public choice insights into bureaucratic and legislative
failures to propose an improved statutory scheme. In some respects, this Article's proposals parallel suggestions of Bruce Ackerman, Richard Stewart, Terry
Anderson and Donald Leal, all of whom have, to varying extents, advocated
that statutory and regulatory schemes should anticipate and utilize private
motivations and use "market-mimicking" mechanisms to achieve statutory
goals more efficiently. See Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985) (discussing strategies of setting
intelligent priorities, making maximum use of resources, encouraging environmentally superior technologies, and avoiding unnecessary penalties on innovation and investment); Terry L. Anderson & Donald Leal, Free Market versus
PoliticalEnvironmentalism, 15 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'y 297, 301 (1992) (advocating that regulatory schemes utilize market dynamics).
This Article differs from the arguments set forth by these authors in that it
focuses on legislatively anticipating responses of market actors and regulators,
and does not advocate creation of a new system of property rights, a proposal
that confronts substantial implementation problems. See Howard Latin, Ideal
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and
"FineTuning" Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L. Rnv. 1267 (1985). This Article
also shows how EPA's actions contradict empirical assertions of these scholars.

See infra notes 170-208 and accompanying text (exploring this contradiction
and presenting other factors relevant to EPA actions). Anderson and Leal furthermore fail to analyze rigorously failings of both markets and political systems. See William Funk, Free Market Environmentalism, Wonder Drug or
Snake Oil?, 15 HLv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 511, 513 (1992) ('To make the case for
property rights and markets, one must address the circumstances where prop-
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goal-cleaning up contaminated sites at minimal expense to the
taxpayer-and analyzes how a failure to anticipate and control
or harness preferences and incentives of regulators and regulated entities has frustrated that goal.
For example, if a regulator is likely to expand upon the legislature's instructions, and that is the legislature's intent, then
limited legislative guidance will suffice. If, however, a regulator
is likely to resist the legislative goal, then stronger instructions
or mandates may be necessary, or possibly the legislature
should choose a different government entity to carry out a political task. Similarly, if regulated entities have preferences or incentives that could further statutory goals, then those private
motivations should be harnessed as part of the statutory
scheme.
Part I explored how current statutes and administrative
policy fail to harness private incentives to undertake voluntary
cleanups to avoid or limit uncertain statutory liabilities. The
section below analyzes legislative and bureaucratic explanations
for the failure to provide a voluntary cleanup approval process.
This section closes by analyzing jurisprudential objections to the
current regulatory schemes.
erty rights and markets have failed, not just [political failures]."). This Article
agrees with these scholars' more fundamental insight that private incentives
should be harnessed where they further statutory goals, and agrees with
Latin's point that unheeded bureaucratic preferences and incentives can defeat

idealized political goals. See also

NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES

(1994) (building on Coase's insight and analyzing the relative merits of various
institutional choices between markets, agencies, courts and legislatures when
attacking a problem). Cf IAN AYREs & JOHN BRArrHwAIE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE

5 (1992) (arguing for "re-

sponsive regulation" sensitive to "context, regulatory culture, and history");
William Eskridge & Philip Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium,108 HARv.
L. REv. 27, 36 (1994) (asserting that decisionmakers in all of the federal
branches behave strategically, engaging in "anticipated response" calculations
by "choosing the course of action that best achieves their goals in light of how
they anticipate other decisionmakers will respond to their own possible
choices").
Two additional institutions that must be considered in designing an effective scheme are courts and the public. In part because the vast majority of
analyses of statutory substance and process has focused on the role of courts in
interpreting statutes, and because courts are not the initial entities that must
implement or comply with statutory goals, this Article does not emphasize their
role. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislationin the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989) (criticizing focus on judicial role in interpreting legislation and offering a theory of legislation for the modern administrative
state). The public's role in overseeing and acting to check official error or privately-caused harms is essential, see infra text accompanying notes 224-226,
but it is not the focus of this Article.
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A. THE "LEGISLATIVE FAILURE" EXPLANATION
An initially appealing explanation of the current CERCLA
and RCRA schemes and their flaws is simply that the political
branches inadequately stated their intent. 60 Instead, the argument goes, the legislature enacted statutes in the traditional
New Deal mode of broadly delegating authority to agency experts, anticipating that EPA would further general statutory
aims. To correct these statutes' current shortcomings, clearer
legislative instructions would suffice. This analysis is somewhat
persuasive, but nevertheless incomplete.
Congress actually did many things right in these statutes,
creating liability schemes that deter future harmful conduct and
giving EPA power to attack contaminated sites. It failed, however, to give EPA explicit authorization to bind the government
in the context of private voluntary cleanup proposals. In significant ways, the legislature discouraged EPA's creation of a voluntary cleanup approval policy like the CAP scheme proposed by
this Article. Nevertheless, EPA was left with weak residual authority to create a voluntary cleanup approval policy, but it has
generally failed to utilize this authority to further broad statutory goals.
1.

Current Federal Statutes Discourage But Would Allow
EPA to Approve Voluntary Cleanups

This section briefly discusses legislative instructions and
mandates to EPA under CERCLA and RCRA's corrective action
program that are relevant to the voluntary cleanup issue. This
section focuses primarily on CERCLA because it is the principal
federal statute governing cleanups of contamination caused by
past disposal of hazardous substances. RCRA is also potentially
applicable to such sites that are still in use, but generally has
not been applied to sites that are not traditional hazardous
waste treatment, storage or disposal ("TSD") facilities. 6 1 As is
shown below, these statutes make any finality and repose virtu60. I will alternatively refer to choices of "the political branches," "Congress" or "the legislature," but the more accurate terminology is to the "political
branches," considering the shared involvement of Congress and the President
in enacting any legislation. See Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretationand

the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 503
n.223 (1989) (stating that the President is the "dominant force in regulatory
policy making").
61. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (analyzing RCRA corrective action scheme).
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ally impossible without site-specific government feedback and
approval of voluntary cleanup plans.
a.

CERCLA's uncertain cleanup standardsand empowerment
of EPA.

As discussed above, in CERCLA and in subsequent amendments, Congress created a broad liability scheme. 62 The statute,
however, gives EPA and PRPs limited guidance regarding
cleanup standards. In addition, while giving EPA generally
broad enforcement authority, CERCLA limits that authority in
the context of settlements with PRPs.
i. CERCLA cleanup procedures and standards.
If a private party or the government desires to undertake a
cleanup, the NCP 63 provides the procedural framework, with
limited substantive guidance. Only if a cleanup is consistent
with the NCP can the government or a private party initiate action to recover cleanup costs from other PRPs in cost recovery or
64
contribution actions.
62. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA liability scheme).
63. The statute mandates the creation of the NCP by the President. The
NCP has been promulgated and amended several times by EPA for the President. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). Guidance on cleanup standards in the NCP are
promulgated pursuant to authority granted to EPA under 42 U.S.C. § 9621
(1988).
64. The NCP is set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1 (1994). The NCP currently requires substantial consistency with its
provisions if the government or private parties are to recover cleanup costs. 40
C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (1994). See, e.g., County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933
F.2d 1508, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991) (consistency with the NCP is an element of a
CERCLA contribution claim); Hatco v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309,
1332-33 (D.N.J. 1992), vacated, 859 F. Supp. 769 (D.N.J. 1994), aff'd, 59 F.3d
400 (3d Cir. 1995) (ruling -substantial consistency" is the appropriate standard
for determining compliance with the NCP); Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc.
v. JFD Elec. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373, 381 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (holding consistency
with the NCP required for private cost recovery); Amland Properties Corp. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 793-801 (D.N.J. 1989) (allowing private party to recover the portion of money expended consistent with the NCP
but denying recovery for remaining costs not in compliance with the NCP); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1576 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(i[The failure to fulfill the more detailed procedural and substantive provisions
of the NCP with regard to remedial' actions becomes a barrier to recovery response costs."); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659
F. Supp. 1269, 1291 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (ruling
that consistency with NCP is an element of a prima facie case for cost recovery
under section 107 of CERCLA); see also Ferrey, supra note 19, at 40, 79-84
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Under CERCLA and its regulations, PRPs cannot know
when a cleanup would be legally sufficient because the NCP and
CERCLA incorporate by reference numerous possible
benchmarks for determining "how clean is clean," thus giving
the government substantial flexibility in deciding the extent to
which a site must be remediated. 6 5 Perhaps more importantly,
judicial deference to EPA's cleanup decisions makes EPA's ultimate judgment call unlikely to be overturned, but the variable
legal standards, risk assessment processes, and scientific uncertainties make private anticipation of that judgment call difficult.66 Highly variable numerical levels of "cleanliness" under
government-directed cleanups indicate the flexibility of cleanup
standards under CERCLA and the NCP.6 7 While one of the
(arguing against judicial blurring of distinctions between cost-recovery and contribution actions).
65. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3) (1994) (explaining when cleanup will be
deemed consistent); 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(5) (1994) (providing cleanup standards); 40 C.F.R. § 300.7006 (1994) (same); 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1994) (amended
in 59 Fed. Reg. 47384 (1994)) (dictating compliance with ARARs); see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 9621(d) (West Supp. 1995) (incorporating by reference standards of
Clean Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, Safe Drinking Water Act,
Clean Air Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
66. See, e.g., Employer's Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656, 666-67
(7th Cir. 1995) (stating courts will defer to EPA's expert judgment about cleanups unless arbitrary and capricious, even though other cleanup decisions could
have been made); United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1441-43 (10th Cir.
1992) (same, but also stating that even if costs are excessive, if expended on
justifiable cleanup, no authority to strike cleanup costs from government cost
recovery action); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
810 F.2d 726, 748 (8th Cir. 1985) (reviewing EPA cleanup choices under an
arbitrary and capricious standard); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884,
899-900 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (stating burden of proving cleanup "inconsistent" with
NCP on defendants). But see Bell Petroleum v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 905-07
(5th Cir. 1993) (stating review should be deferential, but finding no record support for portions of EPA cleanup decision).
67. CormnG CLEAN, supra note 27, at 193-217 (discussing substantial variation in types and levels of approved cleanups and the large disparities in
cleanup costs depending on cleanup standard or technology approved by EPA);
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., SUPERFUND STRATEGY 103124 (1985) (describing the Superfund system and analyzing the consequences of
pursuing different strategies for implementing the program); Donald A. Brown,
EPA's Resolution of the Conflict Between Cleanup Costs and the Law in Setting
Cleanup Standards UnderSuperfund, 15 COLUM. J. ENVL. L. 241 (1990); Erin
Sheridan, How Clean is Clean: Standardsfor Remedial Actions at Hazardous
Waste Cites Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 9, 10-41 (1986/1987).
Reported decisions arising out of disputes over the adequacy of a hazardous
substance cleanup are evidence of less than definite mandates. See, e.g., Amland PropertiesCorp., 711 F. Supp. at 799-800 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding that the
defendant inadequately considered as required by the NCP the use of solvents
and microbes to clean up PCB contamination); Artesian Water Co. v. Govern-
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goals of the 1986 SARA amendments was to make the choice of
cleanup standards less variable, this goal has been, at best, only
68
partially realized.
The variable nature of cleanliness decisions is unavoidable.
Even as critics of CERCLA advocate reducing this variability,
few propose mandating inflexible cleanup standards. Even an
amended CERCLA would require some degree of site-specific
analysis, taking into account a site's geology, population patterns, future use, types and extent of contamination, and the
costs of alternative cleanup techniques and levels. 69 Given that
no two sites will ever be identical in virtually any respect, some
degree of flexibility based on a site's distinguishing characteris70
tics is both desirable and inevitable.
While rigid cleanup standards might eliminate uncertainty
and thus the need for government guidance or approval, such
rigid standards would necessarily lead to excessive or insufficient cleanups.7 1 Unless the country were to unite behind the
ment of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1291 (D. Del. 1987) (ruling
plaintiff's plan to provide alternate water supplies inconsistent with NCP).
68. See Proposals to Reauthorize the Superfund Program: Hearings on
H.R. 3800, Before House Subcomm. on Transportationand HazardousMaterials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 188
(1994) (statement of Carol Browner, Administrator, EPA) [hereinafter Browner
Statement] (conceding problem of inconsistent cleanups and "protracted siteby-site evaluation").
69. See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 11, at 6-8 (advocating narrowing of
variability of cleanups, but still recommending site-specific analysis); Brown,
supra note 67, at 249-59 (discussing tensions in EPA's role in mandating cleanups, setting cleanup levels to protect health and the environment, minimizing
societal and industry costs, and protecting the Superfimd); Sheridan, supra
note 67, at 10-11 (discussing how proposed statutory changes would reduce but
not eliminate site-by-site analysis); The Forum, Different Standards of Industrial Use?, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 34-40 [hereinafter The Forum] (discussing cleanup standards and debating desirability of allowing different levels
of cleanup depending on likely future uses); see also infra notes 235-244 and
accompanying text (discussing 1994 proposed amendments to CERCLA).
70. See 132 CoNG. REc. S14,985-96 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (advocating flexible cleanup standards). Several recent proposals with EPA's support provide
greater cleanup standard flexibility by allowing current and future site-use
characteristics to be taken into account in making decisions about the extent
and nature of a cleanup. See infra notes 235-244 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed CERCLA amendments); see also The Forum,supra note 69,
at 37 (statement of Karen Florini of the Environmental Defense Fund questioning practical problems in implementing variable cleanup standards depending
on future uses of land).
71. In the words of Judge Richard Posner, a codified rule setting an inflexible standard inevitably "overdeters to a certain extent, because its bounds are
uncertain and fear of inadvertent liability causes some people to steer well clear
of those bounds." Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
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goal of a pristine environment without regard to use, risk, or
cost, rigid cleanup standards would pose problems. Excessive
cleanup expenditures would deter reuse of contaminated industrial property, while insufficient cleanups would leave undesirable levels of environmental risk. Recent legislative proposals
call for greater use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessments
in regulatory decisionmaking. 72 If passed into law and superimposed on site-specific activities under CERCLA, these proposals
would create even greater regulatory uncertainty.
Due to this uncertainty, neither the current CERCLA statute, the NCP, nor proposed amendments to either are likely to
reduce significantly, let alone eliminate, uncertainty about
whether a particular cleanup is legally sufficient. Some other
mechanism based on review of individual sites and proposals is
necessary to eliminate the current scheme's interminable liability and to encourage voluntary cleanups.
ii. EPA's enforcement power and discretion.
In CERCLA, the political branches granted EPA vast enforcement authority and discretion,7 3 but with one significant
exception. In the provision most relevant to the voluntary
cleanup problem, and the lack of repose under this statute, the
Statutes and the Constitution,49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 280 (1982). Judge Posner
goes on to say that where substantial liabilities are feared erroneously, 'the
greater [is] the overdeterrence and the resulting costs in socially beneficial conduct foregone." Id.; see also Colin Diver, The OptimalPrecision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 72 (1983) (discussing tensions between "perfectly
transparent rules" and transparent rules that are too cumbersome and deprive
their audience of fair warning).
72. See, e.g., S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 636 (1995) (as reported out of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (requiring cost-benefit and risk assessments for "major environmental management activity," defined as RCRA corrective actions or CERCLA cleanups); 141 CONG. REC. S9546 (daily ed. June 30,
1995) (reciting amendment number 1487 to S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 628
(1995)); see also John Cushman, Republicans Clear-CutRegulatory Timberland,
N.Y. Tmrss Wm IN REV., Mar. 5, 1995, at 16 (summarizing bills in House of
Representatives requiring regulatory reform); White House Shows Support for
Cost-Benefit Test in Superfund Reform, ENVTL. POL'Y ALERT, May 24, 1995, at
11.
73. See discussion supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text (reviewing
CERCLA's broad liability scheme). The 1986 SARA amendments, largely to
protect the CERCLA Superfund's diminishing reserves, strengthened CERCLA's provisions allowing the government to sue or compel a cleanup by less
than all PRPs connected to a site. The SARA amendments alleviated somewhat
the resulting financial inequities by explicitly authorizing PRPs bearing disproportionate cleanup burdens to sue other PRPs for contribution. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) (1988).
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legislature weakened EPA's discretionary authority to enter into
truly final settlements with private parties. The statute does,
however, provide EPA with sufficient discretionary authority to
develop a voluntary cleanup policy or program offering finality
and repose.
Possible cleanup volunteers cannot compel government
suits to create greater certainty about what type of cleanup
would be legally sufficient. Government choices of whom to sue
or compel to take action are usually immune from judicial challenge,7 4 in part because of the prosecutorial nature of those decisions and their presumptive unreviewability under Heckler v.
Chaney.7 5 Furthermore, CERCLA explicitly and broadly limits
the jurisdiction of courts to review any private party challenges
to removal or remedial actions by EPA or orders
to PRPs, unless
76
EPA has initiated a lawsuit against a PRP.
Only through one provision in CERCLA may a citizen request government response concerning a contaminated site. A
person possibly impacted by a release of hazardous contaminants can petition EPA to assess the hazards of that release, but
74. But see infra note 76 (surveying cases upholding courts' jurisdiction to
review EPA CERCLA actions once EPA hales PRPs into court).
75. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). In Heckler, Justice William Rehnquist's majority
opinion made presumptively unreviewable by courts an agency's decision not to
undertake enforcement actions. Id. Courts frequently cite and follow Heckler
despite criticisms that the decision is overly broad. See Ronald M. Levin, UnderstandingUnreviewabilityin Administrative Law, 74 MmN. L. Rav. 689, 75279 (1990) (surveying cases interpreting and limiting Heckler).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). See United States v. Princeton Gamma
Technology, 38 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting broad jurisdictional bar to
judicial challenge of EPA cleanup decisions but, in accordance with statutory
language, allowing challenges to EPA cleanup activities once EPA has initiated
a cost recovery action in court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 107); United States v.
American Color & Chem. Co., 37 F.3d 1489 (3rd Cir. 1994) (same); United
States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., 949 F.2d 1409 (6th Cir. 1994) (permitting judicial review of cleanup plans under 42 U.S.C. § 113(h)(2), (5) prior to completion
of cleanup when government moves to enforce an order or compel remedial
action).
Declaratory judgment actions under CERCLA against the government
have not occurred, and likely would not be recognized, because section 113 precludes judicial review of cleanup plans except in limited circumstances when
EPA forces a party into court. 42 U.S.C. § 113(h) (1988). If a cleanup volunteer
attempts at an earlier date to force EPA to agree to a particular cleanup
through judicial intervention, section 113 ensures failure. Id. Similarly, the
explicitly discretionary nature of citizen petitions for EPA consideration of listing a site on the NPL further supports the view that, under this statute, a declaratory judgment action against the government seeking cleanup approval
would not be recognized. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining
the discretionary nature of EPA's response to citizen petitions).

1995]

SUPERFUND INCENTIVES

EPA is granted complete discretion to deny such a petition. 7 7
Furthermore, it is unclear if persons impacted by a release or
threatened release on their own property, or on property in
which they have a commercial interest, could utilize this provision. 78 Such a petition procedure, however, is only the first step
in investigating and ranking a contaminated site and planning
its cleanup. 7 9 Nothing in CERCLA mandates any further government response to private cleanup proposals.
The settlement provisions of section 9622 also fail to give
cleanup volunteers much hope of finality and repose. This section of CERCLA makes any government decisions whether to
settle claims discretionary.8 0 Nevertheless, EPA has authority
77. Section 9605(d) of CERCLA provides that "any person who is, or may
be, affected by a release of a hazardous [contaminant] .

.

. may petition the

President to conduct a preliminary assessment of the hazards" posed by the
relevant site. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (1988). The President must either conduct
the assessment or explain why an assessment is "not appropriate." Id. While
this section does not preclude judicial review of the executive decision whether
to conduct a preliminary assessment, it explicitly gives the executive the option
of declining with explanation the request for an assessment. Such a decision,
accompanied by explanation, is unlikely reversible by a court given that decision's discretionary nature and the explicit statutory authorization to decline to
undertake an assessment. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (1988); see also Andrea Bull,
Note, Superfund and the Hazardous Waste Site Next Door: Can Citizens Clean
It Up?, 6 PAcE ENVrL. L. REv. 643, 651-52 & nn.51-58 (1989) (discussing petition provision and noting that survey indicated such petitions in Region II are
never denied).
78. Although § 9605(d) of CERCLA unquestionably provides an impacted
neighbor the right to petition, the statute unfortunately does not define the
phrase "affected by a release," so the statutory text does not resolve if any group
of persons cannot avail themselves of this petition process. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d)
(1988).
79. Even if available to a potential cleanup volunteer, such an assessment
is of limited help in ascertaining the government's view of whether a particular
cleanup plan is sufficient. Such an assessment in no way provides the government's view of cleanup proposals.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1988). First, the section says that "[tihe President,
in his discretion,may enter" into settlements. Id. (emphasis added). The precatory language encouraging use of the settlement device is conditioned by the
words, "as determined by the President." Id. The section ends by stating that
"[a] decision of the President to use or not to use the procedures in this section
is not subject to judicial review." Id. Other portions of § 9622 similarly make
the President's settlement-related decisions unreviewable. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(b)(2) (1988) (decision whether to use mixed funding settlements not subject to judicial review); 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(E) (1988) (decision to reject private response to proposed allocation of cleanup responsibility "not... subject to
judicial review"); 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (1988) (decision whether to utilize covenants not to sue in President's discretion). The only minor constraint on the
settlement choices is contained in provisions allowing other PRPs to comment
on and seek to challenge settlement choices contained in consent decrees between PRPs and the government. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2)(B) (1988) (al-
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to pursue truly final settlements; the statute contains precatory
language encouraging such settlements where they would be in
the public interest and consistent with the NCP. 8s
In provisions critical to the voluntary cleanup problem, even
if a private party convinces EPA to enter into a consent decree,
including a covenant not to sue, section 9622 presumptively
makes settlements subject to uncertainty and reopeners. First,
a settlement with a covenant not to sue does not actually take
effect until a cleanup is completed to the government's satisfaction.8 2 Second, the statute mandates that a covenant not to sue
for future liabilities "shall include an exception that allows the
President to sue such person" for future releases from the same
site "where such liability arises out of conditions which are unknown at the time the President certifies" that cleanup is completed.8 3 This broad reopener can only be omitted in
"extraordinary circumstances."8 4 CERCLA does not define this
term, although it enumerates factors to be considered in the decision whether to eliminate the usual reopener.8 5 CERCLA also
gives EPA authority to settle with parties on terms making the
Superfund liable under "mixed funding" agreements.8 6
lowing "persons who are not named as parties to the action" the opportunity to
comment on a proposed judgment before a final judgment is entered). Under
this section, however, the Attorney General is the main evaluator of the reasonableness of a challenged settlement. Id. Apart from the inherent authority of
courts to review the reasonableness of public law settlements, courts have a
limited role under this section; any court's reviewing authority would be constrained under the relevant statutory language allocating discretionary decisionmaking competence to the executive agency. See Henry Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1983) (explaining that judicial review of administrative action "contains a question of the
allocation of law-making competence in every case," and that "itihe court's [interpretive] task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority").
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1988) ("[W]henever practicable and in the public interest ... the President shall act to facilitate agreements under this section."); 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(1)(A) (1988) (authorizing covenants not to sue when
"in the public interest"); 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(b) (1988) (authorizing true finality of settlements in "extraordinary circumstances" and including "public interest considerations" among factors to be considered).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(3) (1988).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A) (1988).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(B) (1988).
85. Id. (stating that the factors to be considered are "volume, toxicity, mobility, strength of evidence, ability to pay, litigative risks, public interest considerations, precedential value, and inequities and aggravating factors" and
additional factors specified in § 9622(f)(4)).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b) (1988). Under current practices, such mixed funding agreements have rarely been used, but are meant to be utilized where an
attempt to allocate cleanup costs leaves an "orphan share" to be allocated
among PRPs or the government. Legislative history indicates Congress antici-
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The statute thus tilts EPA towards partial settlements,
leaving much potential liability and giving little finality to settling parties. The "extraordinary circumstances" and mixed
funding provisions, however, empower EPA to give cleanup volunteers greater finality. Given the courts' general deference to
EPA's development of policy, explicit statutory references to the
"President's discretion," precatory language encouraging settlements and cleanups "in the public interest," and the existence of
explicit statutory language allowing greater finality and certainty in "extraordinary circumstances," EPA possesses discretionary authority to encourage cleanup volunteers with the
87
possibility of enhanced settlement finality.
This weak residual EPA authority aside, nowhere in CERCLA is there a provision creating, or mandating that EPA create, a procedure by which a PRP could propose a settlement to
EPA and compel a response. Without government agreement to
a proposed cleanup, a cleanup volunteer remains vulnerable to
government claims that more cleanup is necessary, or other
PRPs' claims that a voluntary cleanup is legally insufficient and
thus ineligible for shifting of cleanup costs through a cost recovery or contribution action. 8 Any settlements set forth in consent decrees presumptively provide only limited finality except
pated that the availability of mixed funding agreements would facilitate settlements. See Timothy Atkeson et al., An Annotated Legislative History of the
Superfund Amendments and ReauthorizationAct of 1986 (SARA), 16 ENmVL. L.

REP. 10363, 10373-74 (Envtl. L. Inst. ed., 1986) (reviewing mixed funding and
settlement provisions).
87. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary
aspects of settlement provisions). The "extraordinary circumstances" provision,
however, has seldom been utilized or construed. There is only one reported case
discussing the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to reopeners in any
depth. See In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Mass. 1989) (discussing
settlement provisions, congressional concern with Reagan-era "sweetheart
deals," and legislative history indicating truly final settlements are only expected in "rare cases" and striking down a settlement decree because of lack of
usual reopener provisions and because no evidence existed of extraordinary circumstances to justify lack ofreopeners); see also infra notes 120-155 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's policy interpretation of the "extraordinary
circumstances" provision and EPA's reluctance to provide complete covenants
not to sue and repose).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(h)(4) (1988). Under this provision, a party settling
CERCLA liability with EPA in a consent decree, and maybe even in an administrative order, is protected from other PRP cost recovery or contribution suits.
See Ferrey, supra note 19, at 51-53 (discussing cases regarding settlement protection from claims by other PRPs). Of perhaps greater importance, a cleanup
volunteer who proceeds without EPA approval will confront challenges by other
PRPs as to the sufficiency of that cleanup, so recovery in a contribution or cost
recovery action would be uncertain. If EPA has agreed to a cleanup volunteer's
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in undefined "extraordinary circumstances." In short, apart
from the possibility of a preliminary site assessment, a private
party cannot expect or compel a substantive government response to a voluntary cleanup proposal.
b.

The RCRA corrective action scheme also applies to a nonNPL site with contamination

While CERCLA is the statute usually identified with contaminated real property that is not an active waste disposal operation or facility, EPA could also utilize RCRA to deal with
cleanups of contaminated sites. In contrast to CERCLA, which
is principally oriented towards cleanup of inactive contaminated
sites and allocation of cleanup costs, RCRA Subtitle C constitutes a comprehensive "cradle to grave" scheme for the management of hazardous wastes.8 9
One of the categories of facilities subject to RCRA's scheme
is treatment, storage and disposal ("TSD") facilities. The principal focus of this section of the statute and applicable regulations
is on active facilities that, by their nature, treat, store and dispose of hazardous wastes. 90 A parcel of real property might,
however, be identified as a "storage" or "disposal" facility because RCRA hazardous wastes are considered to be stored
where discarded or disposed of at an earlier date. 9 1 RCRA's language gives EPA latitude to subject such a parcel of real property either to response actions under CERCLA, to a permit
process as a RCRA TSD facility, or to a review and approval proproposal, that decision would likely receive judicial deference. See cases cited
supra note 66.
89. See Michael B. Gerrard, Fearand Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous
and Radioactive Waste Facilities:A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived
Crisis, 68 TuLAN L. REv. 1047, 1061 (1994) (stating that the RCRA corrective
action program is still in its infancy and is "very similar to CERCLA's NPL
program but addresses contamination at operating facilities rather than at inactive sites"); see also supra note 28 (citing RCRA provisions that expose contributors to contamination of real property to potential liability).
90. National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, Sites
Subject to the Subtitle C Corrective Action Authorities of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,978, 23,981 (1988). EPA states it has
authority to subject "converters," which had been hazardous waste treatment or
storage sites and converted to generator-only status, to corrective action orders
under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h), but acknowledges RCRA corrective actions focused
"primarily" on TSD facilities. Id.
91. For "interim status" sites, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) grants EPA authority to
issue a corrective action order. Id. at 23,980.
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cess under a RCRA "corrective action" order. 9 2 The onerous and
time-consuming TSD permitting process, which usually takes
four to five years, 93 makes unviable a voluntary cleanup program under TSD permitting; no time-sensitive cleanup proposal
would be consummated if a TSD permit were first required.
However, RCRA gives EPA authority to review and compel
cleanups at facilities requiring corrective action, even if they do
not have TSD permits. 94 EPA can issue corrective action orders
to facilities previously identified as "interim status" facilities,
95
even if those facilities are never granted TSD permits.
Were EPA to begin identifying abandoned or underutilized
real property sites, including industrial facilities, as TSD facilities or sites that could be handled under the corrective action
scheme, then RCRA's corrective action provisions and regula92. In several Federal Register documents, EPA has discussed this overlap
between CERCLA and RCRA and has sought to set general guidelines for when
particular sites or situations should be handled under CERCLA or RCRA programs. The National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites;
Deletion Policy for [RCRA] Facilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,641 (1995); Corrective
Action Management Units and Temporary Units; Corrective Action Provisions
Under Subtitle C, 58 Fed. Reg. 8658, 8660 (1993) (discussing overlap of RCRA
and CERCLA and stating RCRA is both a prevention program and a cleanup
program); The National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste
Sites-Criteria for Determining Unwillingness for Sites Subject to Subtitle C
Corrective Action Authorities of [RCRA], 53 Fed. Reg. 30,005 (1988) (discussing
when permits or orders can be used under RCRA).
93. See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588,
1590 (1994) (characterizing the lengthy permit process as imposing "burdensome financial assurance requirements," and "stringent design and location
standards").
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1988) (discussing EPA's authority to issue corrective action orders).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h)(2) (1988) (authorizing EPA to compel corrective actions at a site qualifying for interim status under § 6925(e) and including the
right to revoke authorization to operate as an interim status facility). See
Amendment to National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan; National Priorities List, 51 Fed. Reg. 21,054, 21,057-62 (1986) (discussing "deferral policy" delineating which sites should be handled under RCRA corrective
action program or CERCLA). While there is no explicit authority for EPA to
order corrective actions at facilities that have not identified themselves as TSD
facilities or sought classification as "interim status" facilities, the RCRA corrective action scheme would be somewhat illogical if a private party's failure to
appropriately identify itself as a TSD facility precluded belated private party
acceptance of corrective action mandates or late EPA identification of a facility
as a TSD facility. See United States v. Indiana Wood Treating Corp., 686 F.
Supp. 218, 223 & n.3 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (construing RCRA to allow EPA corrective
action order for site lacking TSD permit or interim status despite noting lack of
express authority for such order, but stating that to preclude corrective action
authority would undermine congressional intent and EPA's interpretation of its
authority).
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tions would apply. 9 6 Presently, a private party cannot compel
an EPA response to a voluntary corrective action, although some
EPA regions have reviewed, on a case-by-case basis, voluntary
corrective action proposals. 97 Nothing in RCRA precludes EPA's
creation of a voluntary corrective action approval program. 98
2.

The Legislative Flaws in CERCLA and RCRA

Before discussing how CERCLA and RCRA fail to encourage
or mandate EPA creation of a voluntary cleanup approval program, even though such a program would further the statutory
goals of achieving cleanups at the expense of PRPs, the successes of these statutes must be acknowledged. Most notably,
these statutes' liability schemes deter new site contamination.
CERCLA's broad grants of power and discretionary authority to EPA, especially coupled with its broad liability scheme,
keep any parties associated with a contaminated site guessing
about their liabilities and vigilant to avoid future liabilities.
CERCLA and RCRA have thus deterred the creation of new contaminated sites, 9 9 without bureaucratic standard setting expenditures, enforcement activities by EPA, or any scrutiny by
96. TSD corrective actions require much of the same analysis of cleanup
techniques as under CERCLA, but RCRA differs in one important respect.
Under RCRA, a party undertaking a corrective action in connection with a TSD

permit receives administrative approval. Thus, in contrast to CERCLA, RCRA
offers a limited administrative feedback mechanism for private parties.
97. Confidential telephone and in-person interviews conducted with regional and Washington, D.C., EPA officials by the author during 1994 and 1995
[hereinafter Author Interviews]. Officials indicate that a few EPA regions occasionally respond to private voluntary corrective action proposals, but these officials confirm that no EPA program or policy mandates an EPA response to
voluntary corrective action proposals. Id.
98. Government officials concede that the two statutes overlap substantially with respect to cleanup of already contaminated sites no longer receiving
hazardous wastes. Id.; see also CoNG. ADMN. REP., supra note 9, at 36-39 (dis-

cussing RCRA permits and cleanup programs); supra notes 90, 92, and 95 (discussing relevant Federal Register provisions).
99. As Professors Richard Revesz and Lewis Kornhauser have discussed,
fear of falling into the web of CERCLA liabilities will lead private parties to
take substantial prophylactic action to avoid creating new sites without costly
regulatory calibration of incentives and disincentives as would be necessary
with "ex ante" regulatory measures. LEwIs KORNHAUSER & RICHARD REVESZ,
POLICY CHOICES FOR THE REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE (draft distributed
at NYU Law School Superfund Conference 1991) (manuscript at 14, on file with
author). Professors Kornhauser and Revesz conclude that a mixture of ex ante
and ex post measures provide appropriate incentives to deter creation of new
contaminated cites. Id.
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EPA of a particular piece of real property. 10 0 The strict, joint,
several and retroactive liability scheme thus furthers the statutory goal of "minimiz[ing] the burden on the fee-based
[Superfundl"Ol and eases the government's burden in compelling PRPs either to undertake cleanups or to reimburse government cleanup expenditures. The onerous liability scheme also
enhances the likelihood that the government can find PRPs obligated to clean up priority sites.
Despite complaints by industry and banks that CERCLA's
liability scheme is unfair,10 2 the statute has effected a sea
change in the practices of industry and lenders. 10 3 The breadth
of the liability scheme has been key to this achievement. RCRA,
too, is successful both because of fear of corrective action liabilities and because of its "cradle to grave" tracking scheme for hazardous wastes. As discussed in Part I, these statutes' broad
liability schemes could be the motor driving private incentives to
undertake voluntary cleanups, were approvals and repose
04
possible.'
Statutes such as CERCLA and RCRA have also created a
benefit by modifying the public sense of what is right; CERCLA
100. By noting how CERCLA reduces bureaucratic burdens on EPA, this Article is not claiming CERCLA has been implemented with minimal costs. As
many critics have asserted, EPA's efforts to direct and compel cleanups have
been tremendously costly, both for the government and for private parties. See
CONG. ADNnN. REP., supra note 9, at 119-23 (discussing the transactional and
administrative costs of the Superfund program). Additional societal costs in the
form of collateral litigation also have done little to contribute to CERCLA's paramount goal of cleaning up contaminated sites. Id.
101. LANDY ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.
102. See Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections of the Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1043, 1043 n.2 (surveying literature critical of CERCLA); see also supra note 6
(surveying additional literature critical of CERCLA).
103. See Hearings on Administration of the Federal Superfund Program
Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the Comm. on Public
Works and Transportation,102d Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1991) (statement of Douglas Wolf, Natural Resources Defense Council); Stephen Schott, Lender Liability
Under CERCLA-Past, Present and Future, 11 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y 77,
105 n.131 (1992) (reviewing bank survey showing that 88% of banks changed
lending procedures in response to CERCLA liabilities).
104. See OTA, BaOWNFuLDS, supra note 9, at 13 ("[Mt is the potential threat
of enforcement under state or federal superfund laws that is largely responsible
for encouraging private sector participation in these [state voluntary cleanup
approval] programs."); 'Maximum Funding' Urged by House Members to Allow
for Comprehensive Reform of CERCLA, ENVTL. REP., June 30, 1995, at 488
(quoting Environmental Defense Fund attorney's statement that "retroactive
liability, in addition to serving as a funding source, provides an incentive for
voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste sites").
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and other statutes regulating the handling and disposal of hazardous waste have "shaped preferences" and created new norms
of acceptable behavior. 10 5 Any proposal to change these statutory schemes should attempt to retain the beneficial "preference
shaping" and deterrent impacts of the broad liability
10 6
schemes.
The legislature failed, however, to encourage, let alone
clearly instruct, EPA to create voluntary cleanup approval policies or programs. In fact, as shown above, Congress left EPA
only weak residual authority to create such a policy or program.
A fair reading of these statutes suggests that Congress was unconcerned with voluntary cleanup programs, but intended to
create a scheme in which the government always wins contamination cleanup disputes, with little attention to costs imposed on
society or the private sector. This lack of explicit legislative instruction contributed to EPA's failure to resolve the voluntary
cleanup problem. CERCLA's vague allowance of exceptions to
broad consent decree reopeners did not provide EPA with a politically secure environment in which to agree to voluntary
10 7
cleanups, to EPA's possible risk for general societal benefit.
105. See Carol Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DuKE L.J. 1, 30-32 (discussing the
moral exhortation or suasion impacts of law); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HA v. L. REv. 1667, 1704-05 (1975) (stating that
under "economic analysis... preferences are normally assumed to be fixed; ...
[but] tastes and values are shaped by experience [and have] preference-shaping
effects"); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences,EnvironmentalLaw, 22 J.
LEGAL STm. 217 (1993). Of course, this preference-shaping impact of CERCLA
might be of limited duration were the statute to be substantially weakened.
106. Whether some part of the retroactive, strict, joint and several liability
scheme could be modified without losing the deterrent impacts of the current
scheme is debatable. Most critics of the current scheme have inadequately acknowledged CERCLA's deterrent effects, and have called for modification of the
scheme to one based on degrees of fault, measured by percentage contribution
to a particular site. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Geltman, Superfund: A Call for Restraint,in RETHINKING SUPERFUND: IT CosTs Too MUCH, IT'S UNFAM, IT MUST
BE FIXED (1991). Such proposals underplay the difficulty of government attempts to allocate liability, and also fail to address how much of CERCLA's
deterrent effect would be lost if contributors to contaminated sites confronted
more limited liability. In Part I, this Article demonstrates how private desires
to avoid onerous potential statutory liabilities create incentives for voluntary
cleanups.
107. See William T. Mayton, The Possibilitiesof Collective Choice: Arrow's
Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative
Agencies, 1986 DuxE L.J. 948, 962-63 (stating that the vague delegations of
authority "contribute to an institutional neurosis that ma[kes] rational regulation unlikely, if not impossible ....
[If] Congress itself resolves major policy
issues ... then the agency [would have] a politically secure framework in which
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Such a legislative choice to empower the government but require little action of it is not wholly illogical in this era of
strained governmental budgets. 0 8 Imposition of additional administrative costs on EPA would not, however, necessarily create an overall drain on the federal budget or an increase in
societal costs. Additional EPA administrative expenditures to
approve and encourage voluntary cleanups would create many
benefits, as discussed in Part I. Such expenditures would also
reduce the liklihood of later Superfund-financed cleanups of
sites that might have been cleaned up by private volunteers.
Furthermore, the legislative failure to provide private parties a means to obtain government guidance or approval of
cleanup plans is not an inevitable part of the modern administrative state. Numerous regulatory statutes, particularly in the
environmental area, provide government "feedback." 10 9 Such
statutes are designed to allow, if not require, private parties to
ascertain their legal obligations, either by reference to rules or
through a feedback process in which the relevant agency responds to private inquiries or requests. Ascertainable standards
in statutes or regulations are one form of legal feedback. Where
statutes or regulations do not provide a definite answer, permits
and plan approvals are the principal devices by which regulated
parties receive feedback about the legal sufficiency of their conduct.1' 0 CERCLA, which in contrast is a liability-driven statuexpertise [could be] applied so as to make rational social choices possible and
perhaps even likely.").
108. Among CERCLA's main goals is minimizing government expenditures
by "letting the polluter pay." CoNG. AnDim. REP., supra note 9, at 119-20. The
absence of any statutorily mandated response to private inquiries reduces bureaucratic expenditures by EPA. Any statutory scheme mandating government
response to private inquiries would involve increased agency administrative
budget expenditures unless offset by a fee or charging process. Under a CAP
scheme, EPA might also face court challenges to CAP consent decrees.
109. Because of differences between CERCLA, RCRA and other regulatory
statutes, the existence of these other schemes does not in itself establish the
weakness of current federal hazardous substance law or establish that an
analogous procedure would work in the context of contaminated real property
and cleanup plans.
110. Under the Clean Water Act ("CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988),
anyone discharging pollutants through a point source (any "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance"), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988), must obtain a permit from EPA or its state or local designee, to make that discharge legal. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988). Provided that permit applications and related communications are complete and truthful, the discharger can readily ascertain
whether the level of pollutants discharged conform to legal obligations. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(C)(ii) (1988). Similarly, anyone engaging in dredge or fill
activity must obtain a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(f)(2) (1988). In marked contrast
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tory scheme, stands alone among federal environmental statutes
in lacking any mechanism by which a private party can request
and obtain government response to plans that impact the environment and may create liability.
to CERCLA's scheme, the most likely context of punitive or criminal penalties
under the CWA is where a discharger discharges without obtaining necessary
permits or approval in advance. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1988) (civil penalties for failure to obtain a permit); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(a) (1988) (criminal
penalties for failure to obtain a permit).
The Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988), was amended in
1990 and now has an enhanced permit scheme. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(j)(3)
(Supp. IV 1992) (permit program for hazardous emissions); 42 U.S.C. § 7661
(Supp. IV 1992) (setting forth elements of permit programs); 42 U.S.C. § 7503
(Supp. IV 1992) (permits in nonattainment areas); see generally Operating Permit Program Final Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 70). This permit scheme, when implemented, will provide pollution sources
with more certain legal obligations. Municipalities and states must devise and
receive approval for State Implementation Plans ("SIPS") designed to ensure
that the relevant city or state will reach Clean Air Act National Ambient Air
Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). Those
plans go through a complicated and lengthy process of review and approval by
EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. IV 1992). Arguably, the CAA feedback
schemes are not inevitable; under a different statutory scheme, states could be
left to devise SIPS on their own, since rules dictate what levels of pollution are
allowed of specific industries and of new, modified, or existing facilities and
since the Clean Air Act and its regulations dictate what levels of "criteria" air
pollutants are permissible. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992) (providing standards of performance for new or modified sources); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (providing standards of performance for existing
sources). At the peril of facing penalties for not achieving NAAQS, however,
states must seek federal government review and approval of SIP proposals. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2), 7410(k)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1992) (providing SIP plan
components). As discussed above, RCRA's regulation of TSD facilities with real
property contamination explicitly requires commitment to undertake a corrective action plan either when the facility is seeking an operating permit, when a
facility is undergoing closure, or if a corrective action is necessary at a TSD
facility to alleviate an environmental or health risk. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h)(1)-(2)
(1988). EPA either disapproves of the TSD facility's plans, issues a permit, issues a corrective action order, or approves of the corrective action plans. RCRA
does not, however, mandate EPA review and approval of cleanup plans other
than in the permit approval process.
Other federal environmental statutes involve analogous forms of government analysis, instruction, or approval. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1994) (prohibiting sale of a
pesticide until it has been registered); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
99 2603(a)(1), 2604(a)(1)(B) (1994) (mandating that where insufficient data to
determine whether or not a chemical product may pose a risk to health and the
environment, testing is required and if a new chemical substance is to be produced or a chemical substance is to be put to a new use, with 90 days' notice to
the Administrator required); The Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1455b(c) (1994) (providing that state plans must be approved before implementation); The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(a)-(b) (1994) (providing uniform national drinking water standards).
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Outside the federal environmental law context, feedback is
available under the federal antitrust regulatory scheme, in
which transactions above a certain size must be pre-cleared by
either the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") or the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice. Private parties are not
left guessing about the government's position on antitrust issues.1 11 Moreover, numerous states have recently created approval schemes for contaminated site cleanups. These schemes
do not preclude potential federal liabilities, but they do reduce
12

regulatory uncertainty.-

As developed more fully below in Part 1I(B), a statutory
mandate that EPA create a CAP scheme would encourage voluntary cleanups. Even without such a mandate, clearer authorization for EPA to consider creating such a program also would
enhance currently meager incentives for EPA to do so. Lessening legal uncertainty for cleanup volunteers would further improve these statutory schemes. It is unlikely, however, that
mere clarification of legislative desires would prompt EPA to
create a voluntary cleanup program. More pervasive bureaucratic and political propensities, many of which have been identified by EPA, better explain EPA resistance to involvement in a
voluntary cleanup approval process.
One qualification is necessary, however. Any flawed statutory scheme is, of course, ultimately to be blamed on the political
branches. As I conclude below, a modified statutory framework
could better achieve the broad twin goals of contamination
cleanups at the expense of responsible parties. The "legislative
failure" explanation is only partially satisfactory, however, because it focuses inordinately on clarity of instructions; it implicitly assumes that if the legislature articulates its preferences
more clearly, agencies will not "drift" from legislative goals.1 13
111. See infra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing further the antitrust scheme).
112. See infra notes 250-265 and accompanying text and infra Appendix A
(discussing state voluntary cleanup programs and the success of programs offering certainty of environmental obligations and liabilities).
113. See generally James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 111, 118 (1994) (discussing ways in which agencies can drift from statutory goals and instructions); Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure,Administrative
Incentives and the New CleanAirAct, 21 ENVrL. L. REV. 1647, 1659 (1991) ("Administrators will ... avoid these kinds of politically controversial choices if Congress fails to provide unambiguous and unqualified directions."); Matthew D.
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 440
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Even a clear statement of legislative goals, however, may fail
when general and statute-specific preferences and incentives of
regulators and regulated entities run strongly counter to such
goals. 1 14 Better legislative drafting, which anticipates bureaucratic and private preferences and incentives and accordingly
modifies statutory mandates and structures, is far more likely to
achieve statutory objectives than is a mere clarification of congressional goals." 5

B. THE "BuREAucRATc FAILURE" EXPLANATION
EPA's failure to offer a scheme to approve voluntary cleanups may seem difficult to comprehend given CERCLA's and
RCRA's goals and EPA's residual discretionary authority to facilitate voluntary cleanups. EPA's position, however, is consistent with much of the literature on government dysfunction,7
"implementation" failure, 116 and bureaucratic risk avoidance."
Given predictable preferences, incentives, and disincentives in a
bureaucracy like EPA, both related and unrelated to particular
statutory goals, CERCLA's weak legislative authorization of
truly final consent decrees made EPA unlikely to create a voluntary cleanup approval policy. 11 CERCLA and RCRA focus inor(1989) (arguing that to steer agencies to desired outcomes, legislatures can
either write "into the law precisely what the agency is to achieve and how it is
to do so" or "constrain an agency's policies.., by enfranchising the constituents
of each political actor").
114. See Hamilton & Schroeder, supra note 113 (showing through an empirical survey that despite instruction in RCRA that EPA was to enact rules
through a notice and comment process, EPA utilized less costly and less scrutinized procedures by creating policy through informal policy and guidance
documents).
115. As has been extensively argued in the nondelegation debate, clearer
legislative statements of intent would also further democratic accountability
and allow courts better to fulfill their function of checking possibly illegal executive branch conduct. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-89 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing for rejuvenation of nondelegation doctrine and identifying
pitfalls of vague delegations); Mayton, supra note 107 (discussing results of
vague congressional delegations of authority); David Schoenbrod, Separationof
Powers and the Powers That Be: The ConstitutionalPurposesof the Delegation
Doctrine, 36 Am.U. L. REV.355 (1987) (arguing for rejuvenation of nondelegation doctrine).
116. See Latin, supra note 59 (arguing that proposals advocating creation of
a new system of property rights confront substantial implementation
problems).
117. See infra notes 185-197 and accompanying text (discussing governmental efforts to avoid political risks).
118. The failure to utilize an authorized exceptions process here is perhaps
the converse of the problem analyzed by Professor Peter Schuck in his analysis
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dinately on the goal of facilitating government-compelled
cleanups by PRPs. Apart from protecting EPA's position as a
litigant, these statutes reflect little attention to creating incentives for EPA officials to pursue policies that serve broader societal and governmental goals of actually achieving cleanups. 11 9
This section starts by examining how, until recently, EPA has
avoided involvement in approving voluntary cleanups. This section then analyzes EPA's explanations for its refusal to create a
voluntary cleanup approval policy, as well as additional explanations for EPA's actions.
1.

EPA Reluctance to Bind the Government in Response to
Private Proposals or Inquiries

As shown above, EPA might have exercised some of its
residual discretionary authority to provide greater finality for
cleanup volunteers. 20 Instead, EPA interpretive materials
show the agency's reluctance to bind itself.
In 1985, prior to the 1986 SARA amendments, EPA issued a
policy on settlements, acknowledging public sentiment that EPA
policies were discouraging "voluntary private party cleanup actions." 12 1 EPA acknowledged that government-initiated cleanof how statutory exceptions can become the rule when an agency is confronted
with strong constituency pressures or programmatic necessity. Peter H.
Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: RegulatoryEquity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163.
In the context of CERCLA, programmatic priorities of EPA appear to have
trumped concern for the public's desire for cleanups, certainty and repose.
119. A tension exists for EPA and its lawyers who could treat EPA as a client or institution to protect, versus an entity that should always act to further
public goals. An official involved in reviewing "prospective purchaser" policies
stated to the author that in drafting revisions to that policy, among the issues
discussed was the extent to which, in establishing settlement policies, EPA's
lawyers should zealously seek to maximize the strength of EPA's litigation position, or instead surrender some litigation strength for public benefit to EPA's
detriment. Cf Bruce A.Ackerman &William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal:
Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1487 (1980) (criticizing Clean
Air Act's failure to create "sound structure" for EPA and partisans in regulatory
debate to consider the larger aim of protecting and preserving the
environment).
120. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), it does not matter whether Congress has intentionally or unintentionally left a gap or ambiguity in CERCLA's provisions. CERCLA's language is more than sufficient to authorize EPA creation of a voluntary cleanup
program. Similarly, the overlap of RCRA and CERCLA justify EPA creating a
voluntary cleanup approval program under either statute or based on authority
under both statutes.
121. EPA Request for Public Comment on Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034 (1985). Since this policy is still referred to by EPA after
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ups alone would not effectively achieve CERCLA's goal of
"expedited cleanup" of contaminated sites, and thus EPA ostensibly sought to encourage voluntary cleanups. 122 Nevertheless,
the agency stated its reluctance to accept proposals of less than
100% private funding of cleanups in light of the strict, joint, and
several liability of PRPs, which meant, so EPA reasoned, that
the government would seldom be left holding unreimbursed
cleanup costs. 123 The agency guidance also emphasized consideration of the strength of its litigation position in deciding
whether and on what terms to agree to settlements. 2 4 As Dean
Frederick Anderson observed, EPA adopted a "tough enforcement-oriented posture."1 25 On the key issue of the finality of
consent decrees, EPA acknowledged the problem of scientific uncertainty about the efficacy of proposed cleanups and stated that
the more certain the remedy, the greater the finality a consent
decree would provide. Nevertheless, prior to SARA's mandating
of broad reopeners,'12 6 EPA administratively mandated reopeners for any "unknown or undetected conditions," or in light
of new information indicating that a site posed greater risk than
2- 7
originally believed.'
After the 1986 SARA amendments, which mandated reopeners as the norm subject to the "extraordinary circumstances" exception, EPA reiterated its reluctance to provide
consent decrees offering true finality. 128 In a 1987 Federal Register request for comments, EPA narrowly construed the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to broad and eternal
liability.12 9 The only two circumstances that might justify a
lack of reopeners, stated EPA, were following a "premium paythe SARA amendments of 1986 and because it sheds light on EPA's policies on
voluntary cleanups, it is discussed briefly here.
122. Id. at 5035.
123. Id. at 5037.
124. Id. at 5038.
125. Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The
Case of Superfund, 1985 DuKE L.J. 261, 367.
126. See supra notes 24, 80-87 and accompanying text (explaining presumptive reopeners in EPA covenants not to sue).
127. Anderson, supra note 125, at 298.
128. Public Notice, Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,240, 34,244
(1989) [hereinafter Public Comment, Settlements].
129. Request for Public Comment, Superfund Program; Covenants Not to
Sue, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,038, 28,042 (1987) [hereinafter Public Comment,
Covenants].
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ment" by a PRP or a PRP's imminent bankrupcy. 13 0 EPA did
not even mention the possibility of giving true finality and repose to cleanup volunteers.
Regarding settlements with "potential purchasers" of contaminated real property, EPA stated in 1989 that it is "Agenc[y]
policy not to become involved in private real estate transactions."131 The agency further stated that it "will not entertain
requests for covenants not to sue from prospective purchasers
unless an enforcement action is contemplated with respect to
the facility."13 2 The agency acknowledged that this meant that
covenants would "generally" be available only for facilities
"listed or proposed for listing on the NPL," or facilities already
the subject of Superfind expenditures or enforcement. 133 EPA
thus presumptively closed the door to requests for finality in the
context of private voluntary cleanups of sites not on or under
consideration for the NPL.
EPA also indicated that in deciding whether to enter into a
consent decree containing covenants not to sue a prospective
purchaser, EPA would consider whether "entering into [such] a
covenant.., is sufficiently in the public interest to warrant expanding [sic] the resources necessary to reach such an agreement in light of competing priorities for the use of limited
Agency resources." 13 4 EPA noted that settlement at an early
stage might be of little benefit to the agency because it might
achieve the same result anyway by pursuing other viable
PRPs. 13 5 EPA conceded that such a settlement might provide
"an environmental benefit through a payment to be applied to
clean-up of the site or a commitment to perform response ac130. Id. The agency also noted that even when the "extraordinary circumstances" condition is satisfied, SARA allows for the exclusion of reopeners only
when the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement provide "all reasonable assurances that public health and the environment will be protected from
any future releases at or from the facility." Public Comment, Covenants, supra
note 129, at 28,042 (quoting Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of
1986 § 121(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(B) (1988)).
131. Public Comment, Settlements, supra note 128, at 34,241.
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id. EPA noted that it would be less likely to entertain such settlements
if uncertainty existed regarding site conditions or if a prospective purchaser's
activities might interfere with a remedy "ultimately selected" by EPA. Id. The
agency also questioned whether further use of a contaminated site should generally be encouraged given potential hazards to future workers or inhabitants
at that site. Id.
135. Id.
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EPA required a "substantial benefit" for itself from a
prospective-purchaser settlement proposal; it identified as the
chief benefit government avoidance of cleanup costs that the
EPA would otherwise likely bear. 13 7 EPA nowhere mentioned
societal or economic benefits associated with certainty and
138
repose.
After the Clinton administration took office, EPA announced the "Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative"
as part of its "Brownfields Action Agenda."3 9 Through this initiative, EPA seeks to encourage reuse of older industrial areas.' 40 EPA's willingness to provide special consent decrees for
sites under this initiative is unclear at this time. 14 1 After the
fall 1994 election, new Republican majorities ascended to both
houses of Congress, with their explicit agenda of rolling back
regulatory activity, particularly EPA CERCLA activity. Shortly
thereafter, in a 1995 guidance, EPA authorized its officials to
make greater use of prospective purchaser agreements, especially in Brownield areas.1 4 2 In this new guidance, EPA acknowledged for the first time that "indirect public benefit[s]" and
tion."136

136. Id.
137. Id. at 34,242.
138. Id.
139.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Brownfelds Action

Agenda, Jan. 25, 1995, available on WORLD WIDE WEB at http'/
www.epa.gov/docs/Admin Speeches/actagen.txt.html, [hereinafter Brownfields
Action Agenda] (outlining the Brownfields Initiative).
140. See Notice, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), Section 104; Announcement of Competition for Final Five Brownfield Economic Redevelopment Initiative Pilots, 59 Fed. Reg.
60,012, 60,012 (1994) (stating that Brownfields Initiative represents EPA "commitment to help communities revitalize abandoned contaminated properties,"
and thereby to "restore economic prosperity to areas where these properties ex-

ist"); Browner Offers Superfund LiabilityRelief for PropertyRedevelopment, INSIDE EPA, Nov. 12, 1993, at 7 (reporting on Brownfields speech by EPA

Administrator Carol Browner); Michael McIntyre, CleanupProgramGets Trial

Run in Cleveland, THE PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 9, 1993, at 1B (same); see also
Brownfields Action Agenda, supra note 139 (describing the Brownfields Initiative as "an organized [EPA] commitment to help communities revitalize idled or
under-used industrial and commercial facilities").
141. Under the Brownfields Initiative, EPA has reached at least two reported agreements offering finality to an entity planning to reuse an abandoned
industrial site. Both agreements, however, involve sites on EPA's NPL. Seattle

Settlement Agreements Reflect EPA's Push for Urban Redevelopment,
POL'Y ALERT, Sept. 28, 1994, at 9.
142. 1995 Guidance, supra note 35, at 34,793.
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"environmental benefits" provide additional justification for
143
EPA covenants not to sue with prospective purchasers.
EPA also recently implemented a new policy of deleting
screened sites from the list of potential NPL sites (the CERCLIS
144
sites) when the agency foresees no federal action at a site.
143. Id. at 34,794. The 1995 guidance nevertheless shows continued EPA
concern with diverting "resources necessary to reach agreement," id. at 34,793,
and surrendering its strong litigation position and enforcement discretion. See
id. at 34,793-95 (stating that EPA must "obtain adequate consideration;" that
agreements will be considered where there are "substantial benefits for the government;" that agreements are most likely where EPA is likely to impose
Superfund liability on a prospective purchaser; and that agreements should be
"essential" to remove redevelopment barriers). This guidance reflects a new acknowledgment that government agreement with a prospective purchaser may
result in "indirect public benefit" to the community where the site is located,
may "remove Superfund barriers and allow the private party cleanup and productive use, reuse, or redevelopment of the site," and may result in "environmental benefit." Id. at 34,793-95.
Such guidance still falls short of the voluntary cleanup approval program
advocated by this Article. EPA still generally resists involvement in "private
real estate transactions." Id. at 34,793. EPA must itself be convinced that its
agreement is necessary and will create public benefits; markets actors' judgments alone will not suffice. Id. at 34,793-94. EPA will even attempt to analyze implications of a purchaser paying a high or low price for contaminated
property. Id. at 34,794-95. Perhaps most oddly, this guidance does not condition such agreements on private commitments to undertake voluntary cleanups
of any significant contamination, although private cleanup commitments are a
factor favoring EPA agreements with prospective purchasers. Id. at 34,793-94.
Such agreements also remain unavailable to current owners of contaminated
property, leading to incentives for current owners to sell contaminated property. See infra note 227 (criticizing current policy and how it may lead to real
property transfers simply to cap CERCLA liabilities). EPA agreement with a
prospective purchaser does not eliminate other PRPs' potential liabilities assodated with a site. Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Settlements
with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective
Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,794-95 (1995). Under this guidance, a buyer could be left with ascertained liabilities and a seller with uncertain liabilities even where both desire a cooperative cleanup. This uncertainty
may distort negotiation outcomes and might leave a seller with residual liability risk. See supra Part I (discussing negotiation dynamics and disincentives to
cleanup created by uncertain liabilities). EPA also will not, under this guidance, declare a site clean; its form "Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue," appended to the guidance, expressly states EPA is not making any declaration
regarding the condition of a site, although EPA will consider future requests for
consent to assign or transfer the property. Announcement and Publication of
Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,79598 (1995).
144. Where EPA has decided that it intends to take no further action at a
CERCLIS site, it will assign that site a "No Further Response Action Planned"
("NFRAP") designation and delete it from the CERCLIS. Amendment to the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP);
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This delisting, however, is nonbinding on the government; EPA
expressly reserves the right to resume activity at the site if "information so warrants."14 5 In addition, at least one regional office of EPA recently has begun offering two "status letters" to
voluntary cleanup proponents: "No Further Federal Interest
Letters" and "Voluntary Cleanup Letters."14 6 EPA has occasionally responded to voluntary cleanup plans under RCRA's corrective action program, but it has created no program or policy to
facilitate a voluntary cleanup initiative. Moreover, RCRA imposes a lengthy and burdensome administrative process unsuitable for giving private parties timely feedback, finality and
1 47
repose.
EPA's actual enforcement practices at particular contaminated sites during the last decade have been consistent with the
agency's goal of preserving the Superfund by compelling PRPs to
fund or actually undertake NPL-site cleanups. EPA has reached
few settlements with prospective purchasers. 14 It appears that
EPA has never entered into a consent decree with true finality
for any private party seeking EPA guidance with respect to
cleanup of a non-NPL site.14 9
CERCLIS Definition Change, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,053, 16,054 (1995) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). These actions are intended to reduce the stigma and economic drawbacks associated with such listing, and thereby eliminate any possible CERCLIS-related disincentive to purchase and redevelop delisted sites. Id.
at 16,053.
145. Id. at 16,054-55.
146. EPA Region I Announces Measures to Speed Cleanup of Waste Sites,

BNA DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTrVs, Feb. 22, 1995, at 35. While these innovations
are consistent with actions advocated by this Article, they appear inconsistent
with some of EPA's earlier guidance and policy documents. Nevertheless, these
EPA actions and those discussed supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text,
support this Article's view that EPA has sufficient statutory authority to provide a process for approving voluntary cleanups and giving cleanup volunteers
repose. Given statutory restrictions on complete covenants not to sue, it is unlikely that regional administration could preclude future government action
without agreement from EPA headquarters or the Department of Justice.
147. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (exploring the burdensome
nature of the RCRA administrative process).
148. According to an EPA enforcement attorney, EPA has only entered into
a few such agreements. A recent article found a total of only sixteen agreements signed in the history of CERCLA. Howard M. Shanker & Laurent R.
Hourcl:6, Prospective PurchaserAgreements, 25 ELR NEWS AND ANALYSIS
10,035, 10,036 & nn.9-10 (1995). The first four consent decrees reached under
the new 1995 Prospective Purchaser Guidance are awaiting comments. Author
Interviews, supra note 97.
149. At least a handful of volunteer-initiated cleanups have proceeded
through the lengthy RCRA corrective action permit process. A thorough review
of reported consent decrees under CERCLA, however, reveals only a few that
lack reopeners, none of which were identified as involving voluntary cleanups.
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Conversations between the author and numerous EPA officials and attorneys in the regions and Washington reveal broad
agreement with the idea that EPA should encourage voluntary
cleanups, especially at Brownfield sites. 150 Officials working on
enforcement issues, however, resist the notion that EPA should
assume any of the risk of remedy failure or cleanup if additional
contamination is discovered. One stated that "the government
has no talismanic ability to glean what is an appropriate
cleanup."' 1 ' This same official agreed, however, that without
government approval, a cleanup volunteer cannot know if his
52
cleanup would be found legally sufficient by EPA or a court.'
The other fairly consistent response was that budget constraints
limit EPA's capability to undertake a significant new role in approving voluntary cleanups. As one official put it, Remedial Project Managers ("RPMs"), who oversee cleanups in the field, "are
[already] the most stressed employees of [EPA]."' 5 3 Another
stated that "folks will be all over our backs if we make a mistake" and referred to how EPA was "hammered" in the 1980s for
"sweetheart deals."1 5 4 Several officials stated that Congress's
intent regarding an EPA role in approving voluntary cleanups is
unclear. 15 5
EPA has thus done little with its residual statutory authority to encourage voluntary cleanups, except for a recent increased willingness to enter into prospective purchaser
agreements and (in a nonbinding manner) to disavow federal interest in previous CERCLIS sites. Instead, for most of the last
fifteen years, EPA has avoided involvement with private initiatives, even though it has recognized the environmental benefits
of voluntary cleanups. The remainder of this section explores
the reasons for this avoidance.

Inquiries to EPA's central office and several regional offices by the author also
revealed no such voluntary cleanups approved in consent decrees providing
true finality.
150. Author Interviews, supra note 97.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The same official explained this comment by stating that RPMs are
overworked and face potential criticism if their judgments on cleanup methods
turn out to be insufficiently protective. Id.

154. Id.
155. Id.
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CERCLA and RCRA Fail to Anticipate Bureaucratic
Resistance

EPA's reluctance to expand its regulatory domain to include
a voluntary cleanup approval program is contrary both to traditional New Deal expectations that expert agency officials will act
to further the public interest, 1 56 and to expectations that agencies will be "captured" by and act to please regulated industry.1 57 This reluctance is also inconsistent with some broader

assertions of analysts of bureaucratic failure. Instead, the particular scientific, political and statutory context within which
EPA acts under CERCLA and RCRA makes EPA's reluctance to
act understandable. The many risks and potential costs that
would be borne by EPA and its officials, were it to implement a
voluntary cleanup approval program, outweigh the more attenuated benefits officials might derive from such a program.
EPA's reluctance to surrender its programmatic and enforcement discretion for a scheme in which it could be compelled
to respond to private initiatives is consistent with the basic suppositions of many analysts of bureaucratic failure. From the
perspective of the "public choice" school of analysis, 158 one would
expect EPA's implementation of these statutes not to reflect
overarching concern with statutory goals-cleanup of contaminated sites at PRP expense-but rather to reflect efforts by EPA

156. See JAmEs M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 28, 154 (1938) (arguing that administrators will be driven to serve by an "urge for public service,"
a desire for the "satisfaction of achievement," and by a universal "dedicat[ion] to
the idea of justice"); Diver, supra note 71, at 101-02 (discussing New Deal expectation of "public-spiritedness of government officials" and more recent view
that administrators seek to maximize budgets, votes, and power).
157. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371 (1983) (modeling interest
group pressures and outcomes and developing the theory that "pressure groups"
will operate to reduce expenditures on political activities); Roger Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A MultidisciplinarySurvey and Synthesis, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9, 24-33 (Roger Noll ed., 1985)
(summarizing various capture theories); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of

American AdministrativeLaw, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1684-87 (1975) (discussing capture theories but also noting "more subtle explanations of industry orientation"); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGr. ScI. 3 (1971) (developing thesis that "regulation is acquired by
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit"); Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KVELos 575, 591-95 (1982) (summarizing theories of capture).
158. See supra note 58 (discussing briefly the meaning of "public choice").
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officials to maximize their own welfare. 15 9 Under this view, government officials are not passive mediators between private parties seeking a benefit; such officials have their own priorities,
which may be substantially or wholly unrelated to statutory
goals.160
Even scholars who do not adopt a public choice-driven analysis of legislative and administrative process share the view
that effective policy requires anticipating decisionmakers' incentives. 16 1 These scholars share the sound supposition that offi159. WILLIAM A. NIsKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GovErmENT 5, 36 (1971) (asserting that bureaucrats seek to maximize their own
utility).
160. Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102 (1987) (stating that
politicians are not "mere brokers" but are "independent actors making their
own demands"); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A
Study of the Legislative Process As Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 71, 76 (1990) (criticizing many public choice assertions,
but crediting McChesney with the "powerful" argument that politicians are not
"passive brokers," and calling for supplementing rather than abandoning public
choice modes of analysis).
Many public choice scholars focus on interest group pressures and how
those pressures will translate into statutes reflecting the desires of a particular
pressure group rather than the larger public interest. See, e.g., Becker, supra
note 157, at 371 (arguing that policy will be determined by those pressure
groups that operate most efficiently); Stigler, supra note 157, at 3 (analyzing
administrative agency policies and actions). A subset analyzes administrative
policies and actions. See BUREAUCRACY VS. ENmIRONMNT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS Of BUREUCRATIC GovERNANCE passim (John Baden & Richard L.
Stroup eds., 1981) [hereinafter BUREAUCRACY VS. ErmoNiMENT] (collecting essays examining the behavior of regulatory agencies and the impact of that behavior on the environment); NISKANEN, JR., supra note 159, at 5, 9-12
(developing a theory of regulatory "supply" based on individual preferences of
"maximizing" bureaucrats). This subset of analysts of administrative agency
activity has similarly argued that agency policies are generally the result not of
publicly-oriented selfless activities, but rather are the result of individual preferences of agency officials. BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVmoIFNME , supra, at 5; NisKANEN, supra note 159, at 5. George Stigler's seminal economic analysis of
regulation bridges the generally separate treatment of legislative process and
administrative agency activities, alluding to bureaucrats' own incentives, or
"thoughts of self survival." Stigler, supra note 157, at 7.
161. Latin, supra note 113, at 1718 ("Legislators and high-level administrators cannot simply identify the social goals, policies, priorities and procedures
they want implemented. They must also devote careful attention to the kinds of
issues that agencies are asked to resolve and to professional and personal incentives that influence the behavior of agency officials."). Bruce A. Ackerman
and William T. Hassler, in their influential study of Clean Air Act regulation of
coal-burning utilities, similarly explained unduly costly and environmentally
ineffective regulatory efforts by stating that "EPA was responding rationally to
the bureaucratic incentives created by the Act." Ackerman & Hassler, supra
note 119, at 1486. See Michael C. Blumm, The Fallaciesof Free Market En-
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cials' preferences and incentives matter, influencing likely
agency reactions to legislative instructions.
Although analysis of agency officials' preferences and incentives goes far in explaining EPA's unwillingness to encourage
voluntary cleanups, EPA's actions contradict some public choice
predictions. For example, EPA's actions contradict the assertions of Terry Anderson, Donald Leal, and Richard Stroup, who
argue that agency officials are principally motivated by a desire
to obtain increased budget allocations, and thus inexorably seek
to expand their regulatory domain and secure increased budgets. 16 2 The view of these scholars is that agencies expand too
much and should be constrained. 163 Others, by analyzing particular regulatory histories, conclude that agencies seek to expand budgets. 164 Several federal agencies have expanded their
vironmentalism, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. Poi'Y 371, 389 (1992) (rejecting most
arguments of proponents of "free market environmentalism" such as Terry Anderson and Donald Leal, but stating that "[t]hey correctly focus on the fact that
environmental regulation is frequently insensitive to the reality that incentives
matter"); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences,EnvironmentalLaw, 22 J.
LEGAL STuD. 217, 234 (1993) ("[An imperative for environmental policy is to
create incentives that will decrease the use of the underlying polluting activity."); see also Joseph Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 OxLA. L. REV.
239 (1973) (arguing that laws fail when they are "oblivious" to the behavioral
realities of those subject to regulation).
162. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 6-7, 11, 16 (1991); see also BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 160, at 5.
Bureaucrats, like most other people, are largely self-interested. Like
the rest of us, they will sometimes act altruistically to advance the
public interest. In most work-related situations, however, a bureaucrat will act to improve his own welfare.... The components ofbureaucrats' welfare are improved when the agency is growing.... [D]ecision
makers face strong incentives to continually expand the scope of their
agency's activities.
Id.; RODNEY D. FORT & JOHN BADEN, THE FEDERAL TREASURY AS A COMMON
POOL RESOURCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PREDATORY BUREAUCRACY 17
(John Baden & Richard L. Stroup eds., 1981) ("The conclusions reached in [the
literature on bureaucratic pathology] remain fairly consistent with the following: bureaucrats operate to increase their discretionary control over resources.
In sum, they operate to expand their budgets."); L41N McLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE
89-95 (1987) (reviewing thesis that agencies seek to expand budgets); Wallace
E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic CompetitionAmong Jurisdictions:Efficiency Enhancingor DistortionInducing?, 35 J. OF PUB. ECON. 333, 344 ("One
common hypothesis is that bureaucrats seek to maximize budgets.").
163. See, e.g., BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT, supra note 160, at 5-6 (arguing that agencies expand too much, leading to economic inefficiency and destructive policies).
164. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Government As Definer of Property
Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities,and BureaucraticBudgets, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 297 (1990) (analyzing the history of the Indian land allotment pro-
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activities to include individual guidance to regulated entities,
even where their enabling statutes do not require such guidance. 165 The best known agencies providing such guidance are
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), primarily in its letter ruling procedure or opinion letter process, 16 6 the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in its no-action letter process,'167
and the no-action or pre-merger clearance process of the FTC
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 1 68
grams and showing how agency desire to expand budgets best explains the rise
and ultimate demise of the programs).
165. Most federal regulatory agencies have some procedure through which
regulated entities can inquire, with varying degrees of formality and finality,
about the relevant agency's interpretation of law or fact. See Asimow, supra
note 3, at 2-6. Proposed mergers above a certain size are required by statute to
be disclosed to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of Justice. Other advisory
activities of the FTC, Antitrust Division, IRS, and SEC are not mandated by
statute.
166. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(1) (1995) ("It is the practice of the Internal
Revenue Service to answer inquiries... whenever appropriate in the interest of
sound tax administration. . . ."); MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMIIE, FEDERAL INcoM TAXATION 771-72 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing private letter rulings
and determination letters). Issuance of these letters is discretionary, and the
IRS has published a list of circumstances where such opinions will not be issued. Almost all these circumstances involve inquiries that are factually complex, involve hypothetical situations, or are novel. See Rev. Proc. 93-1, 1993-1
C.B. 313; 15 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 44,368 (1994); 26 C.F.R. § 601.201
(1995) (all discussing guidance available to the public). Such determination letters can be revoked. 15 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 44,282.0133 (1994); see
also id. 1 44,368.01 (discussing "closing agreements," that are conclusive as to a
taxpayer's liability except in cases involving acts of fraud or malfeasance).
167. The SEC issues "No-Action" and interpretation letters that inform the
public and practitioners of the "informal views" of the SEC on proposed transactions. See generally Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42
Bus. LAw. 1019 (1987) (detailing the background, purposes, and mechanics of
the SEC No-Action letter process); Lewis D. Lowenfels, SEC "No-Action"Letters: Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLUm. L. REv. 1256 (1971)
(detailing problems associated with the No-Action letter process and suggesting
revisions to the existing No-Action machinery). SEC decisions whether to provide such letters are discretionary. Lemke, supra, at 1033. As with the IRS,
the SEC is less likely to issue an opinion if the proposal or inquiry involves an
inherently factual inquiry or presents a novel issue where the SEC prefers to
allow the law to evolve. Id. These letters are not formally binding on the SEC.
Id. at 1042.
168. Both the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
("Justice") allow parties contemplating an acquisition or merger to receive preclearance for the transaction. 16B Bus. Organizations: Antitrust L. & Trade
Reg. (MB) § 15.0212] (1992). In contrast to the SEC and IRS, the FTC will issue
a public advisory opinion where the issue presented is novel or is of public interest. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9731 (1988). The FTC will not consider hypothetical questions or questions that would require extensive investigation or
inquiry. 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1992). The FTC can revoke its advisory opinions. Id.
at § 1.3. Justice's "business review letters" express the agency's enforcement
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These activities are consistent with the budgetary expansion hypothesis, although the fact of such activities does not establish
underlying motivations of agency officials. Such additional work
pleases a regulated constituency and allows for expansion of the
169
agency and attendant increased budgets and job security.
To the extent the "budgetary expansion" theory is intended
as an inevitable law of agency behavior, however, EPA's conduct
contradicts it. EPA resisted expanding its programs to advance
broad statutory goals or please regulated entities. If, however,
one looks at budgetary expansion as a propensity of agency officials, or perhaps agencies as a whole, which may be countervailed by other assessments of costs and benefits, then EPA's
behavior here is evidence only of the many factors that
agency
170
officials consider when making regulatory decisions.
The legislative task is to identify the factors that shape officials' likely preferences or incentives. 1 71 Even if most bureauintentions. 16H Bus. Organizations: Antitrust L. & Trade Reg. (MB) § 92.01[2]
(1992). Despite any intention conveyed in a letter, Justice remains free to bring
an action or proceeding believed to be required by the public interest, and may
refuse to respond to inquiries altogether. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1992). See generally
E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997 (1986) (discussing Antitrust Division regulatory activities).
169. As discussed infra, notes 171 & 173 and accompanying text, Ronald
Johnson and Gary Libecap question the accuracy of the budgetary expansion
hypothesis, and EPA's actions discussed in this Article further weaken the theory that agencies inexorably seek to expand budgets. Nevertheless, EPA policy
statements show concern with losing control over, and preserving, budgets. See
supra notes 134-135, 142-143 and accompanying text (exploring this concern).
170. As cited in note 113, supra,McCubbins et al., and Hamilton & Schroeder have found that agencies will avoid burdensome procedural requirements;
while they do not analyze how such avoidance relates to budgetary incentives,
such avoidance of complex regulatory activity supports the observation that
agencies may avoid politically risky activities. See infra notes 184-197 and accompanying text (discussing preferences of agency officials and describing
EPA's actions as consistant with risk avoidance motivations); see also Robert C.
Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to RationalActors: A Critique
of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989) (praising
the contributions of law and economics scholars, but calling for consideration of
psychology and sociology to "enrich the explanatory power and normative
punch of economic analysis"); Shaviro, supra note 160 (advocating supplementation of economic models with a greater variety of factors considered by political officials in making political choices).
171. In a sense, some of the overly broad assertions, and thus possible limitations, of public choice scholars such as Anderson, Leal, Stroup, or Niskanen,
may be in part the result of semantic distinctions. While economists generally
speak of preferences as innate to individuals, preferences are also shaped by
some conception of a baseline environment that creates a set of costs and benefits, or risks and rewards, for particular choices. Statutory and administrative
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crats have some usual set of generic preferences (such as budget
expansion, greater regulatory coverage, public service, or personal wealth and job security), surely these preferences and incentives will not always, or equally, prevail in all regulatory
contexts. 172 This Article's examination of EPA activities under
CERCLA and RCRA indicates that generic preferences, if they
actually can be proven to exist, 173 can be overcome by the spe17 4
cific incentive structures within which bureaucrats operate.
structures may also shape and modify preferences. Cf Sunstein, supra note
105, at 221 ("[S]ometimes there are no acontextual preferences with which to do
normative or positive work. Preferences can be a function of the initial allocation of the legal entitlement.").
In the context of EPA's failure to create a voluntary cleanup program, for
example, one could speak of pervasive bureaucratic preferences to avoid risk,
expand budgets, and maintain job security. One might speak, however, in the
alternative of "incentives" created by general administrative and political structures that in turn shape choices made, given the bureaucrat's preexisting "preferences." No bright line distinguishes where baseline preferences end and
incentives begin in guiding or influencing a bureaucrat's choices. Baseline preferences could be an individual's state of mind after graduation from college,
after job training, or perhaps even generally existing within EPA's bureaucracy.
Incentives might be identified as risks and rewards created under a particular
statutory environment such as CERCLA or RCRA. See, e.g., Ronald N. Johnson
& Gary D. Libecap, Agency Growth, Salariesand the ProtectedBureaucrat,27
ECON. INQumY 431, 433-48 (1989) (discussing preferences as more generic tendencies, particularly tendencies to seek maximization of monetary wealth, and
discussing incentives as legal or administrative structures designed to constrain or control bureaucracies to reduce agencies' diversion from a principal's
intent); Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, BureaucraticRules, Supervisor
Behavior,and the Effect on Salariesin the FederalGovernment, 5 J. L., ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 53, 54 (1989) ("Bureaucratic rules both reduce contracting and
monitoring costs to limit agency problems and provide a structure for instilling
incentives. In doing so they limit and mold supervisory discretion in contracting with subordinates to increase output.").
172. George Stigler states that "[a] rational man must be guided by the incentive system within which he operates.... An efficient enforcement system,
therefore, requires intelligent guides to the regulators .... " George J. Stigler,
Regulation: The Confusion of Means and Ends, in REGULATING NEW DRUGS 13
(Richard L. Landau ed., 1973).
173. See Johnson & Libecap, supra note 171, at 448 (concluding that, contrary to the assertion that agency bureaucrats will seek to increase agency size
and budgets as a means to increase salaries, empirical survey does "not reveal a
strong significant linkage between changes in staffing and salaries within an
agency.... [P]romoting growth does not appear to be the way to increase
salaries.").
174. The conclusion reached in this Article that EPA activities contradict
some analysts' predictions of agency behavior is not intended to belittle the importance of trying to ascertain usual or general preferences and incentives in
solving political problems. Indeed, this Article advocates just such an exercise.
The observation made here is more limited; EPA has not sought to expand its
budgets and regulatory coverage, at least in the short term. Viewed in the long
term, EPA's actions may have enhanced officials' job security by reducing the
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A particular statute's mandates and the political climate at
the time both of statutory enactment and of agency implementation inevitably modify agency and agency officials' assessment of
1 75
what conduct is in the agency's or official's best interests.
Tested against a broader hypothesis that agencies and agency
officials are motivated by political reward and recognition,
agency power and discretion, the job security associated with
positive recognition or at least avoidance of risk, as well as possible personal satisfaction with acting altruistically to improve
the environment, EPA's actions under these statutes are
76
understandable.'

Perhaps most important to EPA's decision not to expand its
activities to include voluntary cleanup approvals is the particular statutory context in which it operates under CERCLA and
RCRA. As shown above, Congress did not give EPA explicit authority to approve voluntary cleanups. By leaving EPA discretion to create a voluntary cleanup program only through an
exception process in which all presumptions disfavored any finality or depletion of the Superfind, Congress created a climate
leading to predictable official assessments of political risks and
benefits. Fearful of criticism, EPA officials approached with
trepidation any surrender of EPA discretion and consequent po-

likelihood of criticism and concomitant budget reductions. See infra note 197
(presenting theory of Louis De Alessi rejecting regulatory expansion hypothesis
but embracing idea that officials will act to enhance job security). The theory
that agencies inexorably seek to expand their budgets may need modification to
take into account other factors that may trump a general tendency to seek regulatory expansion. Whether the budgetary expansion hypothesis retains its
resolving power in most instances can be determined only by empirical examination of a variety of actions by agency officials under different statutory
schemes.
175. See McCubbins et al., supra note 113, at 440-45 (discussing how Congress creates statutory mechanisms to reduce bureaucratic drift from statutory
goals, but showing how agency noncompliance may not be rectified by future
legislatures because of modified legislative coalitions); see also Hamilton &
Schroeder, supra note 113, at 116-19 (analyzing use of statutory procedural
constraints to reduce agency drift); Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins,
DesigningBureaucraticAccountability, 57 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 91, 91-94,
106-10 (1994) (discussing agency control mechanisms).
176. The dearth of analysis of statute or program-specific incentives may be
less the result of denial that such incentives may matter than the result of the
difficulty of measuring such impacts. See, e.g., Johnson & Libecap, Agency
Growth, supra note 171, at 448 (focusing primarily on how the civil service
structure impacts bureaucratic interest in programmatic expansion, but also
stating that [greater prestige and additional perquisites may also be associated with a growing agency, but these are all difficult to quantify").
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tential exposure of Fund dollars. 1 77 Under CERCLA, agency officials "feel compelled to be norm-defining regulators, enforcers,
and monitors while also functioning as a deep pocket that will
178
try to minimize its obligation."
The "budgetary expansion" hypothesis may have less resolving power in periods of fiscal austerity. Any CAP scheme would
reduce agency discretion to allocate scarce agency resources.
EPA officials must make the best use of a generally fixed or
shrinking budget, even as the political branches since 1980 have
added additional statutes and programs to EPA's enforcement
burden.' 7 9 EPA must preserve scarce budget resources for the
most visible and pressing problems.' 8 0 If Congress or EPA created a CAP scheme frequently utilized by the private sector,
EPA would have to provide staff and attorneys to evaluate each
cleanup proposal. A voluntary approval scheme would thus necessarily cost something, unless offset by a fee or other charging
scheme. 8 ' EPA could no longer unilaterally dictate its own
budgetary and enforcement priorities, but would have to respond to each voluntary cleanup proposal.' 8 2 As EPA noted in
declining to review such proposals, 8 3 voluntary cleanups would
frequently concern sites not on the NPL. Thus, all of these bu177. EPA's wariness of surrendering its discretion is evident in its narrow
construction of CEROLA's "extraordinary circumstances" provision. See supra
notes 120-155 and accompanying text (describing EPA's reluctance to provide
final consent decrees and the agency's narrow construction of the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to broad and eternal liability). EPA used none of
its discretionary policymaking authority to expand upon this language to further statutory ends.
178. Anderson, supranote 125, at 365. Anderson concludes that agency officials "feel conflict and confusion about the attitude they should adopt toward
negotiation" of cleanup decisions with PRPs. Id.
179. In conversations with the author, EPA attorneys and officials doubted
that EPA would be allocated more budget funds if it undertook voluntary
cleanup approvals. These officials stated that EPA strives to address the greatest risks with its limited budgets. Author Interviews, supra note 97; see generally JOEL MINT, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKEs AND HARD CHOICES
(forthcoming 1995) (noting that EPA faces increased statutory obligations unaccompanied by concomitant budget increases); James L. Regens & Robert
Rycroft, Fundingfor EnvironmentalProtection: Comparing Congressionaland
Executive Influences, 26 Soc. Sci. J. 289 (1989) (same).
180. EPA highlighted this limitation when the agency declined to provide
consent decrees with true finality. See supra note 134 and accompanying text
(describing when EPA would be least likely to enter into a consent decree).
181. See infra notes 228-233, 250-264 and accompanying text and Appendix
A (discussing fee and charging system alternatives under the CAP proposal and
under state schemes).
182. See infra notes 228-229 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 133-135, 142-143 and accompanying text.
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reaucratic expenditures of time and money would be in addition
to current agency activities.
The scientific risk and uncertainty that pervade the task of
reviewing cleanup proposals further explain EPA's resistance to
creating a voluntary cleanup approval program. Assessing the
risks posed by a contaminated site, the best technological and
scientific means to remedy that contamination, and what constitutes a sufficiently clean site requires intensive, recurrent, and
costly review of voluminous documentation. 18 4 Even after all of
this effort, uncertainty remains. Unavoidable judgment calls in
preparing risk assessments and cleanup plans make any final
consent decree with a cleanup volunteer fraught with risk for
EPA officials; remedy failure and unforeseen site risks expose
EPA decisionmakers to criticism for leaving EPA and the
Superfund responsible for the costs of later additional
cleanup. 18 5 "In the present political dynamic of the CERCLA
program, failure to clean up a site at all has fewer consequences
18 6
for the Agency's reputation than cleaning it up inadequately."
EPA's task is thus distinguishable from IRS, SEC, or antitrust agency activities: if those agencies make an error, the associated costs are generally borne by the public as a whole, not
by the agency itself or the federal budget. Relevant enabling
statutes for the SEC, IRS, FTC and Antitrust Division also do
not presumptively prohibit agreements providing finality, as
does CERCLA.18 7 Antitrust premerger clearance is actually required in some contexts.' 8 Furthermore, these economy-regu184. Under the current scheme, EPA-led cleanups at NPL sites take an average of three to four years to proceed from an initial remedial investigation to
a final decision concerning the nature, extent, and feasibility of a cleanup.
CONG. ADmne. REP., supra note 9, at 53. Non-NPL sites take substantially less

time to review and clean up; any contaminated site, however, requires laborintensive review.
185. Substantial criticism of Reagan-era EPA officials for approving allegedly "sweetheart," or lax, cleanups by industry has further heightened EPA officials' concerns about the political risks of erroneously approving insufficiently
protective cleanups. See infra note 204 (citing case discussing Reagan era
"sweetheart deals"); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text (describing
Remedial Project Managers as the "most stressed" of EPA employees).
186. Anderson, supra note 125, at 312. As Anderson asserts, "[i]f a toxic
dump that the EPA has cleaned up, or has allowed to be cleaned up, later
presents a significant hazard, the Agency is likely to be viewed as responsible
for any harm to persons or resources." Id.
187. See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text (describing procedures
by which the SEC, IRS, FTC, and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department provide guidance to regulated entities).
188. See PHLiP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTrrRusT ANALYsis 110-11
(1988) (discussing advisory opinions and clearances); see also supra note 168
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lating agencies' areas of work lack the legal and scientific
uncertainty that pervades cleanup proposals.1 8 9 The SEC and
IRS have generally removed themselves from the task of responding to factually complex and time-intensive inquiries.1 90
EPA's reluctance to act here is analogous to the sluggishness of the Federal Drug Administration ("FDA") and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") in
reviewing and making decisions, respectively, about the safety
and efficacy of drugs and safe levels of exposure to workplace
toxins. As one industry official commented about FDA's slow approval of new drugs, the FDA "is almost never criticized for failing to make any decisions . .. and indeed the history of the
handling of thalidomide in the United States is a classic example of the awards of procrastination." 191 As Professor (now
Judge) Guido Calabresi remarked, the public or politicians may
view imprudent FDA drug approvals leading to harm or death
as a "situation in which it can be said that some victims [were]
sacrificed by our government."192 In 1988, the difficulty and risk
of OSHA's task led it unsuccessfully to promulgate an omnibus
regulation of over four hundred workplace occupational health
hazards. 93 Much as FDA and OSHA move slowly because of
scientific uncertainty and fear of blame, EPA has understandably been reluctant to expose itself to blame for erroneously lax
94
cleanup approvals.
Analysts of employee behavior within corporate bureaucracies similarly conclude that risk avoidance is a powerful moand accompanying text (discussing FTC and Antitrust Division clearance procedures for parties contemplating an acquisition or merger).
189. See Melvyn Kopstein, Science for Superfund Lawyers, 19 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,388 (Sept. 1989) (discussing scientific uncertainty in CERCLA cleanup decisionmaking).
190. Asniow, supra note 3, at 24-25; see also supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (describing the procedures by which the IRS and SEC provide
individualized guidance to regulated entities).
191. William N. Hubbard, Jr., PreclinicalProblems of New Drug Development, in REGULATING NEW DRUGS, supra note 172, at 49. Largely because of
slow FDA review, thalidomide had not been cleared for use in the United States
when actual birth defects linked to thalidomide occurred in Europe. Id. at 47.
192. Guido Calabresi, Comments on PreclinicalProblems of New Drug Development, in REGULATING NEW DRUGS, supra note 172, at 58.
193. See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992) (striking down
OSHA's attempt to issue an omnibus regulation as lacking the requisite substantial evidence required for each permittable exposure limit).
194. EPA was vociferously criticized early in CERCLA's history for moving
slowly in evaluating and undertaking contamination cleanups. COMING CLEAN,
supra note 27, at 3. Such regulatory delay is consistent with EPA's wariness of
involvement in voluntary cleanup approvals.
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tivator for bureaucrats. Psychologically driven to avoid making
risky decisions, employees within corporate bureaucracies will
frequently act not to maximize the corporation's welfare, but to
protect their job security. 1 95 In a huge hierarchical bureaucracy
like EPA, it is fair to posit that similar risk avoidance by agency6
19
officials would play a major role in policymaking decisions.
Risk avoidance is consistent with EPA resistance to providing
finality and repose to voluntary cleanup proponents, as well as
with staff decisions not to utilize the "extraordinary circum97
stances" exception to broad reopeners in covenants not to sue.'
195. See Ralph 0. Swalm, Utility Theory-InsightsInto Risk Taking, HARv.
Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 123, 134 (reporting a study in which business
people made choices with their own best interests, rather than the interests of
the company, in mind); see also William Carney, Fundamental Corporate
Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 Am. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 69, 117-18 & n.190 (citing risk perception psychology studies in connection with different investor reactions to likely or unlikely risks); Isaac Erlich &
Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3. J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 262-64 (1974) (concluding that it is a plausible assumption that "people
who engage in socially desirable activities are risk averse"); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRIcA 263, 265 (1979) (explaining "that people overweigh problems
which are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable").
196. Analysts of consumer behavior have found similar evidence of avoidance of error. See Norman I. Silber, ObservingReasonable Consumers: Cognitive Psychology, Consumer Behavior and Consumer Law, LOYOLA CONSUMER L.
REP., Spring 1990, at 70-71 (discussing the regret hypothesis, which "proposes
that consumers' choices are affected by their desire to avoid later finding that
they would have done better had they chosen differently").
197. One of the underpinnings of the "budgetary expansion" hypothesis is
that expansion will enhance job security. See supra notes 159-160, 162-164,
169-170, 173-174 and accompanying text (discussing hypothesis that self-interest of bureaucrats leads to desire to expand budgets). EPA's reluctance to undertake a new task that would pose risks to its officials is thus consistent with
this underlying rationale of the budgetary expansion analysis; the end result,
however, is agency opposition to short-term programmatic expansion.
An alternative explanation for EPA's refusal to facilitate voluntary cleanups is that ultimately such facilitation of private cleanups could threaten future
government jobs displaced by private efforts. This anti-privatization theory
seems unpersuasive. If one takes seriously the economics perspective that officials look out for their immediate interests, it is hard to see why they would
forego immediate programmatic expansion to create long-term agency work.
Today's officials cannot be certain they will be working in the government in the
future, and even if they anticipate long-term government employment, the
present value of long-term work would have to exceed the present value of
programmatic expansion to make avoidance of expansion explainable by reference to a desire for job security alone. Were EPA confronting a choice between
doing cleanups itself now or giving up such work to the private sector, the antiprivatization explanation would be more tenable. Here, however, EPA could
have expanded programmatic reach and budgets, but did not do so. For a skeptical survey of pro-privatization literature, see Michael Schill, PrivatizingFed-
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Reluctance to approve voluntary cleanups is also partially explainable by the fact that a CAP scheme would only provide attenuated political rewards for EPA. Most of the direct benefits
of encouraging industrial site reuse would flow to local governments in the form of tax revenues, increased employment, and
enhanced real property values.1 98
Perhaps another explanation for EPA's reluctance to expand its domain, as would be anticipated by adherents to the
budgetary expansion hypothesis,1 99 relates to the mode of
agency activity. Assumptions or observations of excessive
agency output may hold true more often in the context of agency
promulgation of regulations than in the context of agency adjudicatory activities. 20 0 Much as legislators frequently grant
broad lawmaking authority to agencies, allowing legislators to
eral Low Income HousingAssistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 878, 881-88 (1990). Nevertheless EPA's actions here are consistent
with long-term concerns about protecting budgets and enforcement discretion.
See Louis De Alessi, On the Nature and Consequences of Private and Public
Enterprise,67 MmIN. L. REV. 191, 206 (1982) (arguing that instead of seeking to
expand regulatory domain, "government employees have greater incentive to
allocate resources to enhance their job security, thereby increasing the present
value of all future job related pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources of utility").
Again, this alternative hypothesis of official behavior does not result in budgetary and programmatic expansion, but something closer to turf protection.
EPA's reluctance to give approvals to cleanup volunteers is also arguably consistent with Congress's instructions regarding settlements. See supra notes 8088, 120-155 and accompanying text (describing statutory restrictions on EPA
settlements).
198. See discussion infra Part DI (further analyzing the different awards
and costs confronted by state, local or federal officials in undertaking cleanup
approvals).
199. See supra notes 159-160, 162-170, 173-174, 197 and accompanying text
(discussing hypothesis of bureaucratic goal of budget expansion).
200. The distinction here is between rulemaking-type activities in which
EPA is issuing a rule or regulation of general applicability and an adjudicatory
context in which officials within EPA must make actual choices with respect to
an individual potentially subject to CERCLA or RCRA liabilities. See generally
PETER L. STRAuss BT AL., GELLHORN &BYsE's ADmmNSTRATrvE LAw, at ch. 3 (9th
ed. 1995) (materials distinguishing rulemaking and adjudicatory activity).
Much of the public choice literature asserting that agency officials will act to
expand budgets makes little distinction between different modes of agency action. See supra notes 162-170 and accompanying text (discussing the hypothesis that bureaucrats desire to expand budgets). Regulatory reform proposals
pending in Washington during the summer of 1995 are based in part on the
view that agencies expand and excessively regulate. See S. REP. No. 90, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1995) (stating that agencies have produced too
much regulation causing market dysfunction, imposing excessive costs on the
public, and regulating excessively small risks); see also supra note 14 (describing a congressional committee counsel's belief that bureaucrats desire
expansion).
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dodge difficult political judgment calls, 20 1 agency officials might
readily regulate to show their audience in the political branches
and the public that they are diligently carrying out statutory
goals. 20 2 Thus, agencies may issue regulations even when those
regulations might have little impact or remain unenforced. In
addition, regulations generally impose burdens primarily on
those regulated, not on agency regulators. 20 3 It seems less likely
that an agency such as EPA would seek to expand adjudicatory
obligations. In contrast to rulemaking, an adjudicatory process
would require substantial expenditures of agency resources and
would expose agency officials to new work and to criticism for
20 4
real-world outcomes.
A final, more intangible explanation relates to prevalent
ideologies or perceptions of agencies and their employees. Much
as an agency like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may come to identify its task and agenda with the interests
201. This theory is most developed in debates over the non-delegation doctrine. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section
7 Game, 80 GEo. L.J. 523, 534 (1992) ("There are numerous reasons for Congress's willingness to delegate significant lawmaking power to agencies, including the institutional advantages agencies have in developing detailed policy
prescriptions and the congressional inclination to avoid or defer controversial
policy decisions."); see also JoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUST 131-33
(1980) (quoting Representative Elliott H. Levitas' statement that "[wlhen hard
decisions have to be made, we pass the buck to the agencies with vaguely
worded statutes").
202. See Mayton, supra note 107, at 960 & n.45 (explaining that given a
statutory mission, agencies will "succumb to the enduring compulsion of agencies ... to regulate"); see also Louis Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1113, 1123, 1134-35
(1954) (characterizing the "siren song of regulation").
203. See Diver, supra note 71, at 102 ("A policyaker... [will] choose a rule
that minimizes the sum of his rulemaking and enforcement costs... [and] ignore its adverse consequences for private transaction costs, noncompliance, or
incongruent behavior.").
204. See In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1034 (D. Mass. 1989) (discussing political criticism of "sweetheart deals" in CERCLA consent decrees
during Reagan era); Author Interviews, supra note 97 (quoting EPA officials'
concerns with criticisms of EPA).
The realities of modern lengthy and contentious rulemaking processes,
however, weaken the assertion that rulemaking activities would be viewed by
rational agency officials as less burdensome than adjudicatory processes. See
Hamilton & Schroeder, supra note 113, at 127 (discussing EPA's utilization of
guidance documents and less costly policy releases to achieve the same outcome
as more publicized and contentious notice and comment rules); see also Richard
J. Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Rulemaking, 47 ADmiN. L. REv. 59, 60-62
(1995) (discussing ossification of rulemaking process and agencies' efforts to
avoid lengthy rulemaking procedures). Nevertheless, an ill-advised rule would
seldom lead to criticism of a single official as might an ill-advised adjudicatory
decision.
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of those subjected to discrimination, not the employers it regulates, EPA officials have historically shown distrust of industry
and have resisted giving industry a large role in determining the
timing and nature of contamination cleanups. 20 5 EPA's enforcement-oriented relationship with industry under CERCLA is at
odds with the more client-oriented relationship that would exist
under a cleanup approval program. 20 6 EPA's current head of industrial policy recently conceded just this problem, stating that
EPA needs to become more "consensus-based" and "less adversarial," which would require a "culture change" for many EPA
2 7
officials. 0
Given the preferences and incentives at play under CERCLA and RCRA, if Congress wants to encourage voluntary
cleanups, it must articulate with greater clarity, probably
through mandates, that EPA create a program akin to the CAP
scheme. Generic bureaucratic preferences or incentives, coupled with the particular climate, incentives and risks created by
CERCLA and RCRA, make EPA creation of a voluntary cleanup
program extremely unlikely, absent explicit legislative mandates or new reward structures for voluntary cleanups. EPA's
avoidance of such an approval scheme is rational when one arrays the numerous risks specific to these statutes against the
205. EPA for years resisted allowing PRPs a substantial role in risk assessments, remedial investigation and feasibility studies that precede cleanup decisions. See CoMING CLEAN, supra note 27, at 52-57 (discussing EPA position on
private participation in CERCLA processes and risks of industry self-policing).
EPA subsequently modified its position and allowed a larger industry role in
evaluating contaminated sites. See Supplemental Guidanceon PerformingRisk
Assessments in Remedial Investigation/FeasibilityStudies Conducted By Potentially Responsible Parties,EPA Administrative Materials, 17 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,404 (July 2, 1991); Releasing Information to PotentiallyResponsible Partiesat CERCLA Sites, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 32,251
(Feb. 28, 1990). Analysts of government opposition to privatization efforts
might also argue that EPA would resist private voluntary cleanups out of fear
of being embarrassed by private volunteers performing better cleanups. See De
Alessi, supra note 197, at 206-08 (arguing officials will make choices to maximize long-term prospects); Schill, supra note 197, at 881-89 (summarizing the
rationale for privatization).
206. Such an ideological or institutional disposition creates the opposite results from that anticipated under the usual capture theory of agency activity;
rather than EPA coming to identify its tasks with the needs of industry, EPA
behaves more like an enforcer or prosecutor. See Anderson, supra note 125, at
367 (discussing EPA reluctance to negotiate with PRPs and surrender "its
tough enforcement-oriented ... posture").
207. Robert Benson, Chief, Pollution Prevention and Toxic Branch, Industrial Sector Policy Development, Address at the University of Georgia Red Clay
Conference (Mar. 11, 1995).
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attenuated possible
benefits to EPA of a voluntary cleanup ap20 8
proval process.
C.

REPOSE AND CERTAINTY SHOULD BE REGULATORY GoALs

As shown above, a strong economic argument can be made
that a voluntary cleanup approval process would benefit private
market actors with connections to contaminated real property
(who could ascertain and cap liabilities), federal government
budgets (by reducing exposure of the Superfind for initial cleanups of contaminated property), and society (by reducing incentives to abandon contaminated Brownfield sites, reducing urban
and suburban sprawl, assisting efforts to rehabilitate such sites,
and creating certainty so real property could reenter the market). Viewed through the prism of property scholars with an economics orientation, the shortcoming of the current CERCLA
and RCRA schemes is that they impair marketability of particular parcels of real property by making uncertain the extent of
property liabilities. 20 9 Yet it is possible that the number of such
sites and the administrative costs of reviewing cleanup proposals, coupled with possible future government liability for additional cleanups, could make a CAP scheme costly, at least from
208. In addition, as discussed in Part III, infra, positive incentives in the
form of political rewards are much less tangible at the federal level than they
are at the state or local level. This difference in positive political incentives
explains why numerous states have initiated their own voluntary contamination cleanup approval processes.
209. Richard Posner, Harold Demsetz, and, to a lesser extent, Carol Rose all
see certainty of legal obligations associated with real property to be one of the
cornerstones of an efficacious private real property scheme. See, e.g., RicHADm
PosNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 32-33 (1992) (discussing need for certain
and exclusive property rights); Demsetz, supra note 34, at 347 ("Property rights
. . . derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those
expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others."); Carol
M. Rose, Possessionas the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 78 (1985)
("Society is worst off in a world of vague claims; if no one knows whether he can
safely use the land, or from whom he should buy it if it is already claimed, the
land may end up being used by too many people or by none at all."). Without
certainty, real property transfers will be deterred and investments in real property will not be made.
Although these property rights discussions make convincing arguments regarding the likely market or economic benefits of certainty, they explore less
thoroughly other values that might be implicated by a lack of certainty. Professor Rose has, however, sought to articulate some of the norm-creating benefits
flowing from environmental schemes involving "moral suasion or exhortation,"
even where such schemes may neglect market choices and the benefits of harnessing market dynamics to achieve environmental ends. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 Du=c L.J. 1, 30-32.
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the perspective of the federal government. 2 10 It is also possible,
although unlikely, that the number of cleanup volunteers would
be so few that society as a whole would see little benefit. 2 11 For
these reasons, it cannot be posited with certainty that net economic benefits would flow from such a plan, even if particular
property owners would benefit. This section explores how
noneconomic, jurisprudential values nonetheless weigh in favor
of a CAP scheme.
An ideal regulatory scheme would offer either discoverable
standards in existing codified law or an adjudicatory process by
which those regulated could ascertain their status. Such a regulatory scheme would offer finality, certainty, and repose for regulated entities. A regulatory scheme lacking certainty and
repose, while perhaps protective of administrative agency flexibility and discretion, is vulnerable to criticism on "rule of law"
grounds. 212 Lon Fuller, Friedrich Hayek, H.L.A. Hart, and Jus210. The government might expend administrative resources in reviewing
cleanup proposals plus bear financial liability in the event additional cleanup
later becomes necessary. Indirect tax benefits from site rehabilitation might be
less than such administrative costs.
211. States that have instituted a variant on the proposed CAP scheme have
approved numerous voluntary cleanup proposals. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note
12, at 64-65 (discussing likely success of Indiana voluntary cleanup program);
Ken Haberman, Recycling Dumps, N.Y. TmEs, Jan. 15, 1994, at A19 (reporting
that almost 500 sites in Minnesota have had successful voluntary cleanups); see
also infra notes 254-257 and accompanying text (describing the New Jersey
cleanup approval program and its 3600 cleanup volunteers); supra note 36 and
accompanying text (describing industry desire for voluntary cleanup approvals); Appendix A (summarizing substantial response to and political impetus for
voluntary cleanup approvals at the state level).
212. Various scholars use the phrase "rule of law" to signify a legal scheme
that provides certainty, discoverable legal rules, and constrained or limited government authority against citizens. See generally Harold J. Berman, The Rule
of Law and the Law-Based State, THE HAIi IN INST. F., May 1991, at 1 (tracing the historical development of the "rule of law"); Scalia, supra note 1 (explaining the importance of certainty and continuity in our legal system). The
"rule of law" is frequently used to distinguish a system of ascertainable codified
or written decisional authority from a system giving decisionmakers broad discretionary power. Scalia, supra note 1, at 1177. In the words of Friedrich
Hayek, one of the most zealous advocates of a predictable rule of law, "[t]he
interference of the coercive power of government with our lives is most dis-

turbing when it is neither avoidable nor predictable." F. A.HAYEK, THE CoNsTI-

143 (1960). Hayek further states:
[If the government] tell[s] me what will happen if I do this or that, the
laws of the state have the same significance for me as the laws of nature; and I can use my knowledge ofthe laws of the state to achieve my
own aims as I use my knowledge of the laws of nature.
Id. at 142. But see KENNETH C. DAvis, DIscuRroNARY JUSTIcE 32 (U. of Ill.
Press 1973) (1969) (criticizing Hayek for "absurdity" in advocating an "extravagant version" of the rule of law).
TUTION OF LIBERTY
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tice Scalia all argue that certain and discoverable law is simply
a necessary component of a legitimate legal system. 213 Hart
posits that where no ascertainable rules resolve a legal question,
"later settlement" will be available through recourse to "informed, official choice." 2 14 A statute like CERCLA, which imposes substantial liabilities but lacks both codified standards
and a means for fixing liabilities, is problematic because a contamination cleanup volunteer confronts a scheme under which,
to use Hart's words, "informed, official choice" cannot be obtained. 2 15 Under the RCRA and CERCLA schemes, certainty
through statute or regulation is not possible given the varied
conditions and risks of contaminated sites. 21 6 Citizens associated with a contaminated property thus cannot with any certainty conform their conduct to a standard and avoid future
liability, nor can they utilize an adjudicatory process to discover
2 17
their particular cleanup obligations.
213. LON L. FULLER, THm MORALIT= OF LAW 33-41 (rev. ed. 1977) (discussing
through the parable of Rex the perils of ad hoc decisionmaking or excessively
rigid law); H.L-. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 129-30 (2d ed. 1994); HAYF,
supra note 212; Scalia, supra note 1.
214. HART, supra note 213, at 130. Hart states:
[A]ll systems, in different ways, compromise between two social needs:
the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely
be applied by private individuals to themselves without fresh official
guidance or weighing up of social issues, and the need to leave open,
for later settlement by an informed, official choice, issues which can
only be properly appreciated when they arise in a concrete case.
Id.
215. Id. Justice Scalia similarly criticizes avoidable discretionary justice in
a recent essay. He expounds upon the tensions between a system of discretionary, case-by-case, "totality of the circumstances" resolution of legal disputes and
a system comporting to the "rule of law" which offers more certain, "previously
enunciated rule[s]." Scalia, supra note 1, at 1178-79.
Neither Fuller, Hart nor Justice Scalia address schemes like CERCLA, and
to a lesser extent RCRA, where the government, or more accurately the taxpayer, is the insurer of last resort if no private party is available to clean up a
contaminated site. If a CAP scheme were adopted, it would lead to a final consent decree under which the government would be responsible for some or all of
any potential unanticipated future cleanup costs of a site. See infra notes 227234 and accompanying text (discussing division of liability for unanticipated
later cleanup costs). There is thus a counterweight to the argument of scholars
such as Hart, Fuller and Justice Scalia who share the supposition that indeterminate and undiscoverable law is undesirable. They appear to envision a
scheme in which government sets legal standards, not a scheme where the government itself faces potential liability. Here, a more certain scheme risks imposing administrative and cleanup costs on the government and the taxpayer.
216. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (discussing the discretionary nature of CERCLA and variable cleanup standards).
217. In the criminal law context, the doctrine of lenity seeks to avoid such a
problem of liability based on uncertain legal prohibitions. Under the lenity doc-
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A legal scheme creating interminable contamination liability is objectionable, apart from economic and empirical arguments about real-world impacts, because citizens face a
government whose powers in connection with contaminated
sites are largely unlimited. By failing to require government response to voluntary cleanup proposals, CERCLA and RCRA fail
to constrain EPA's enforcement power and discretion in any
meaningful way. Even a soft mandate that EPA give substantive responses to cleanup proposals would act to constrain or reduce the government's substantial and threatening
discretionary authority; "rules allocate power,"21 8 and rules requiring responses would appropriately constrain that authority.
Much as respect for judicial precedent is essential to the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking,2 1 9 creation of more certain regulatory schemes would further valuable legal goals of certainty,
predictability and repose. This section's criticism of CERCLA's
potentially interminable liabilities does not propose that EPA be
disabled from acting in the face of uncertainty about contamina2 20
tion problems. The CAP scheme proposed by this Article
leaves agency officials with substantial discretion to decide the
type of cleanup necessary at a contaminated site, even where
the legal or scientific bases for decisions are uncertain. Under
this Article's CAP proposal, however, EPA would lose the unfettered discretion to allocate its resources as it chooses and the
ability to turn down requests for government feedback concerning substantial voluntary cleanups.
The idea is not to prohibit the discretionary exercise of authority, but to "find the optimum degree for each power in each
trine, criminal laws will be construed against the government where the criminal law provisions do not clearly prohibit particular conduct. See generally
Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity and the Statutory Interpretationof Cognate Civil and CriminalStatutes, 69 bND. L.J. 335 (1994) (exploring the doctrine
of lenity and its use in criminal, and more recently, civil settings). Under CERCLA and RCRA, however, a real property owner faces potentially disastrous
liabilities but confronts highly discretionary rules and receives no guidance or
feedback. Unlike the lenity situation, Congress in CERCLA and RCRA has created positive law that sets forth legal standards, but those standards set forth
so many potential variables that they provide little guidance. See Diver, supra
note 71 (discussing and comparing rules with so many variables they deprive
audience of warning).
218. Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth
Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REv. 199, 269 (1993).
219. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 1178-80 (exploring importance of respect
for precedent).
220. A more complete description of the CAP scheme is set forth infra Part
Ill.A. and notes 223-234 and infra text accompanying note 286.
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set of circumstances." 2 2 1 The "choice to do nothing-or to do
222
nothing now" is one form of discretion that must be bridled.
Whether one focuses on the onerous potential liabilities the government can impose under CERCLA and RCRA, notions of legal
legitimacy, or the general desire to constrain discretionary government authority, a CAP-like scheme would be an improvement, even if its economic benefits are uncertain.
III. THE CLEANUP APPROVAL PROCESS ("CAP")
SCHEME AND THE FEDERAL VERSUS STATE
IMPLEMENTATION CHOICE
Recent developments show new state and federal interest in
providing cleanup volunteers with an approval process. This
section sets forth in greater detail this Article's proposed CAP
scheme, analyzes recent state and federal developments, and
evaluates the merits of state-directed alternatives to a purely
federal CAP scheme. Because the political and economic benefits of approved and final cleanups are locally felt, state or local
governments have greater incentives to implement voluntary
cleanup approval programs than do federal officials. Local officials, however, are likely to be more easily pressured to approve
lax cleanups than federal officials unconcerned with interstate
competition to attract or retain business. This section therefore
argues that states should be given authority to institute CAP
schemes, subject to both threshold programmatic review by the
federal government and potential federal appellate review of
disputed state cleanup approvals.

A. THE CAP PRoPosAL
This section proposes a CAP scheme for proposed voluntary
cleanups. Between CERCLA's mixed funding provisions, the
"extraordinary circumstances" exception to reopeners in covenants not to sue, and increased utilization of the RCRA corrective action scheme, EPA could survive any challenge, with a few
minor exceptions, to its creation of the following procedure to
respond to voluntary cleanup proposals.223 However, for reasons discussed above, it is unlikely EPA would ever voluntarily
221.

DAvis, supra note 212, at 4.

222. Id.
223. It is uncertain whether the Superfund could be used to fund the administrative costs of reviewing cleanup proposals. EPA generally has used
Superfund dollars only for NPL sites, although CERCLA does not explicitly so
mandate. COMING CLEAN, supra note 27, at 195-96.
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create such a procedure, so statutory modification is likely
necessary.
A CAP scheme would entitle parties interested in undertaking an appropriate cleanup above a specified magnitude at an
NPL or non-NPL site to submit a cleanup proposal to EPA or its
designated representative, possibly a state or local government
agency. 22 4 While the government would have no obligation to
fund the initial cleanup, it would be obligated to review the
cleanup plan. In accordance with the current NCP process, any
cleanup plan would be made public and subjected to public,
state, and municipal comment. Following the assessment of
risks posed by the site, choices of cleanup technology, and agreement about the extent of cleanup that would suffice, EPA or its
designee would respond to and ultimately agree to a CAP consent decree. The consent decree could be challenged by any opponents either at the initial agency level, in an administrative
appeal (possibly from state designees to EPA)2 2 5 or in federal
court for the district in which the contamination site is
22 6
located.
224. Some limitation on the size or magnitude of anticipated cleanups is
necessary to avoid saddling federal officials, or their designees, with substantial
administrative expenses for minor cleanups. Conversations with EPA and
state officials indicate that sites below a half million dollars are generally handled by state and local governments, while sites above $10 million dollars are
frequently federal sites. Author Interviews, supra note 97. Perhaps only sites
estimated to cost above a half million dollars to investigate and clean should be
able to utilize the CAP scheme. Sites below that magnitude would remain subject to possible local or state supervision. See discussion infra Parts III.B-C.
(considering the allocation of such responsibilities to federal, state or local authorities). Nevertheless, a binding federal disavowal of interest in a particular
site or cleanup volunteer as a PRP would enhance incentives to clean up a site.
OTA, BROWNFIELDS, supra note 9, at 6-8, 26 (acknowledging uncertainties
about the scope of contamination, possible state or federal actions at a site, limited assurance provided by state cleanup approvals, and the possible need for
federal program approval or site-specific federal approvals or disavowals of interest). See supra note 144-145 and accompanying text (discussing new nonbinding EPA delisting process).
225. See infra Parts II.B-C. (discussing delegation of authority to states).
226. It is, on balance, preferable to involve agency or federal court appellate
review only when someone challenges the legality of a cleanup decision, rather
than in connection with every approval. Such periodic appellate review would
reduce duplication of government activities. See Markell, supra note 11 (asserting need to avoid excessive redundancy and discussing benefits of a more
streamlined process). Appellate review triggered only by an objector would be
akin to the "fire alarm" statutory schemes that McCubbins and his co-authors
(also known as "McNollgast") have proposed. See McCubbins et al., supra note
113, at 434 (explaining how politicians can rely on constituencies' "fire alarms"
as an indication of agency noncompliance). The lack of finality at the moment a
CAP consent decree is signed will leave a degree of uncertainty for cleanup vol-
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In contrast to current settlement policy, compliance with
the CAP consent decree would provide substantial repose to a
cleanup volunteer. In itself, government review and approval of
cleanup plans would provide some security and repose. Moreover, if changes in law or discovery of unremediated contamination were to require further cleanup, EPA or its state designee
would be obligated to undertake or fund a percentage of that
2 27
cleanup.
Dividing the burden of any unanticipated later cleanup
would reduce incentives for strategic nondisclosure or partial
site investigation by PRPs. Such a division would also deter desultory review of cleanup proposals by government officials. The
precise division of obligations in the event of later necessary
cleanup would depend on the particular facts of a proposed
cleanup, the needs of the local jurisdiction, and the previous involvement of the cleanup volunteer with activity causing the
contamination. 228 All repose and finality could be terminated
unteers for a limited time for possible appellate review or challenges. Because
appellate review provides protections against unduly lax or collusive "sweetheart deals," however, this reduction in certainty is acceptable.
227. Voluntary cleanup approvals should be provided not only to new or prospective real property owners, but also to current property owners. These statutory schemes are not based on culpability, but on responsibility. No
compelling reason exists for government policy regarding cleanups virtually to
force current owners to engage in real or paper transfers of contaminated land
just to gain the benefits of final and approved cleanups. Unfortunately, both
EPA and several states target their voluntary cleanup approval initiatives toward approvals only for prospective purchasers, not current owners. See supra
notes 131-137, 142-143 and accompanying text (discussing EPA policy toward
potential purchasers) and Appendix A infra (listing state programs and statutes). Nevertheless, some differences in treatment are appropriate. See infra
note 228.
228. The proposed CAP scheme, however, would allow such flexibility only
within a range. Exactly how these costs associated with unanticipated additional cleanup should be divided is one of the most difficult issues in designing a
voluntary cleanup approval program. If all reasonably unforeseen costs were
borne by the government, the government would become the insurer of all remedy failures and private parties would have strong incentives to make the minimum necessary level of disclosure. While government financing would strongly
encourage cleanup proponents to undertake cleanups, it would also create incentives for diligent government supervision.
Dividing unforeseen cleanup expenses would still create incentives for private parties to volunteer, but would incrementally deter private parties hoping
to foist liabilities onto the government and, in turn, the taxpayers. Because of
the substantial costs incurred in designing and installing necessary equipment
and in implementing actual cleanups, private parties responsible for a share of
future cleanups would have an incentive to make adequate cleanup plans. Of
course, diligent government review and approval of plans would be the best
check on private abuse of such a cleanup approval program, but remedy failures
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were the government to establish that the cleanup proponent
willfully, knowingly or recklessly failed to disclose complete information about site conditions or cleanup plans.
A state implementing an approved CAP scheme would also
have access to Superftmd dollars in the event of unanticipated
necessary additional cleanup. As under current law, the state
would retain a percentage of any possible future government
cleanup liability.2 2 9 To harness agency incentives to expand
budgets or avoid budget depletion, 230 CAP administrative costs
should be recoverable from cleanup volunteers, either through a
fee or through site-specific compensation 2 for
government time
31
expended in reviewing cleanup proposals.
A CAP consent decree would explicitly preclude any later
enforcement under RCRA, CERCLA, or any state statutory
scheme. Such a decree would also provide contribution protection to the CAP proponent. 2 32 In contrast to recent Superfund
amendment proposals, 23 3 a party entering into such a consent
remain likely at some remediated sites. The exact division of unforeseen
cleanup expenses could either be negotiated on a site-by-site basis, depending
on the scope of the cleanup plans, or on a programmatic basis. Since a non-PRP
has no advance obligations in connection with a contaminated site, a CAP consent decree with a non-PRP volunteer should leave a greater portion of any
unforeseen later liabilities for the Superfund. Some latitude to modify the costsplitting formula depending on a city or region's cleanup needs would be appropriate, provided states pay any government liability above the cost-division presumptively set under a CAP scheme.
CERCLA or RCRA should also allow state or federal officials to require a
"premium" payment akin to an insurance premium to offset future possible
cleanups. The premium amount would be calculated on a case-by-case basis.
States implementing a CAP scheme might choose to pay the premium for
cleanup volunteers to provide further incentives for voluntary cleanups.
229. Under current law, states remain liable for 10% of government-financed cleanups of NPL sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1994).
230. See supra notes 159-160, 162-170, 173-174, 197 and accompanying text
(discussing the budgetary expansion hypothesis).
231. Although such a scheme would be consistent with EPA's current practice of requiring PRPs in cost-recovery actions to pay government oversight
costs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently rejected
that practice as unlawful. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d
Cir. 1993). Contra Colorado Dep't of Toxic Subs. Control v. SnyderGeneral
Corp., 876 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (declining to follow Rohm & Haas as
"misguided"). A statutory amendment to allow such a fee or administrative reimbursement therefore may be necessary.
232. See supra notes 66 & 88 and accompanying text (discussing cleanup
volunteers' vulnerability to claims against them by the government or other
PRPs).
233. See H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 408(e)(1)(C) (1994) (authorizing
more final settlements than under existing law but conditioning that greater
finality on settlor's promise not to sue others in contribution actions).
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decree would not be precluded from suing other responsible parties. Prohibiting CAP proponents from pursuing causes of action would create a substantial disincentive to use of the CAP
scheme. As under current statutory law, existing common law
actions for personal and property injury would still be allowed
2 34
against a CAP proponent.
Recent federal and state developments reviewed below show
a trend toward providing repose through mechanisms similar,
but not identical, to the proposed CAP scheme.
B.

RECENT FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES

1.

Superfund Amendment Proposals

During the 1994 Superfund amendment proposal process,
which ultimately resulted in no amendments to the statute, EPA
was a prime player in the drafting of the Clinton administration's proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994. This proposal
was later introduced in Congress as H.R. 3800.
The EPA proposals contained several changes of relevance
to this Article. First, the proposals attempted to reduce the
threat of burdensome liability by creating a discretionary and
non-binding allocation process through which parties might ultimately confront not strict, joint and several liability far exceeding their actual contributions of contaminants to a site, but
prorated liability shared among existing PRPs.23 5 This proposal

did not, however, eliminate EPA's discretion to seek to impose
strict, joint and several liability on a PRP. The EPA-proposed
amendments also sought to narrow the breadth of possible
cleanup standards, 23 6 but coupled that narrowing with authority to take into account "future use" of a site.2 3 7 Thus, while the
234. Some advocates of state voluntary cleanup approval programs propose
that private tort suits also be preempted by voluntary cleanup approvals.
O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 66. While some preemption would increase the degree of finality and certainty for cleanup volunteers, neighbors injured by contamination could be left without a remedy. From an economic viewpoint, it is
preferable for decisionmakers to bear the full and accurate costs of their activities so they make accurate market decisions, rather than allowing the costs of
harms to remain external. See Demsetz, supra note 34 (discussing the role of
external costs in the development of property rights). But see Coase, supra note
45 (arguing that modification of liability rules might be disfavored if they deter
socially desired conduct, but showing that net social welfare will be unchanged
by liability rules that can be modified in bargaining).
235. H.R. 3800, supra note 233, § 409.
236. Id. § 502.
237. See id. § 502(d)(2)(A) (stating that generic standards for cleanup should
consider future uses); § 502(d)(3) (stating that site-specific analysis of future
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proposed changes in one section slightly reduced uncertainty in
determining "how clean is clean," other proposals required even
greater tailoring of cleanup decisions to the particular attrib-

2 38
utes, risks, and possible future uses of a contaminated site.

The EPA proposals also contained provisions intended to
encourage voluntary cleanups. 2 39 These provisions, however,
did not impose any such programs on EPA or any other federal
authorities. Instead, they gave states the option of implementing voluntary cleanup approval programs. 2 40 Such programs
would have to meet federal thresholds of quality and enforceability if states were to seek access to Superfind dollars. 2 4 1 Several members of Congress introduced similar bills designed to
give states authority to implement voluntary cleanup approval
programs while providing federal grants and other assistance to
encourage such programs. 2 42 These proposals differed slightly
from EPA's proposal but similarly did not mandate any new
EPA voluntary cleanup approval process. Since the Republican
Party gained a majority in both houses of Congress in the fall of
1994, it began a substantial push to eliminate CERCLA's retroactive liability scheme. 24 3 House Republicans also reportedly
plan amendments to RCRA to ensure that RCRA and CERCLA
2
better dovetail. "
use may be used to establish cleanup levels); § 502(d)(4) (explaining the national risk protocol to be used in determining the degree of cleanup required);
§ 503(b) (noting the variables to be weighed in selecting remedies).
238. In another provision, EPA proposed that "bona fide purchasers" who
cooperate with the government be provided special protections from future liabilities associated with a previously contaminated site. Id. § 403(a)(5)(C). For a
definition of bona fide purchaser, see id. § 605(e)(39).
239. Id. § 201 (providing state program referrals and authorizations); id.
§ 301(a)(1) (voluntary response provisions with stated purpose and objective of
"promoting and encouraging the.., development and expansion of State voluntary [cleanup] response programs").
240. Id. § 301(c).
241. Id.
242. See H.R. 3843, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) (bill entitled 'Brownfield
Cleanup and Redevelopment Act," providing federal certification of state programs and requiring official state certification of completion of satisfactory
cleanups); S. 773, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (bill entitled "Voluntary Environmental Cleanup and Economic Redevelopment Act of 1993," providing grants
and information to assist state efforts).
243. See House Risk ProposalCalled Threat to Program;Senate Debate Focuses on Retroactive Liability, 25 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 2293 (Mar. 17,
1995) (reporting on Republican support for elimination of retroactive liability).
244. House Republicans May Seek RCRA Reforms During Superfund Debate, 16 Inside EPA (Inside Washington Publishers) No. 19, at 11 (May 12,
1995).
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Much as EPA's response to its residual authority under
CERCLA and RCRA has been to avoid creating a voluntary
cleanup approval program, EPA's 1994 statutory proposals are
notable for their limited scope. Despite acknowledging the need
to reduce uncertainty to encourage industrial reuse, 24 5 EPA only
proposed to give states the option of creating such a program.
EPA nowhere creates a federal approval alternative. EPA thus
continues to avoid involving itself in voluntary cleanup approvals. The recent amendment proposals also fail to mandate state
creation of such programs, so the proposals, if ever enacted into
law, are likely to leave some cleanup volunteers without a government process by which cleanup proposals can be reviewed
and approved.
EPA's recent Brownfields administrative initiatives 24 6 run
counter to its avoidance of cleanup approvals. These initiatives
do not, however, mandate any particular EPA action. 2 47 The
new prospective purchaser guidance and nonbinding "no further
action" designations are the most substantive steps EPA has
taken to encourage cleanup volunteers. 2 48 The issuance of these
new policies when EPA and CERCLA are under attack shows
yet again the influence of the political environment on agency
249
choices.

245. See Browner Statement, supra note 68 (stating that fear of Superfund
liability "discourages investment in industrial areas").

246. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's
Brownfields Action Agenda and additional incentives intended to encourage reuse of older industrial areas).
247. One might look at EPA's recent efforts as confirmation of the importance of political pressure. EPA has faced substantial criticism for its alleged
contribution to abandonment of rustbelt industrial sites. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text (discussing such criticism). The limited administrative initiatives to approve some voluntary cleanups, particularly the Brownfields Initiative and the increased provision of 'prospective purchaser" consent decrees
with finality, are best seen as part of an EPA effort to respond to criticism by
Congress and regulated entities. Several EPA officials with whom the author
spoke said EPA realized it "had to do better" as the Superfund reauthorization
process commenced. Author Interviews, supra note 97.
248. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text (describing EPA procedures for deleting sites from the CERCLIS).
249. See supra notes 160, 170-179, 197-198, 208 and accompanying text (discussing importance of political framework and climate on agency choices).
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Recent State Initiatives Provide an Optional Feedback
Mechanism for Cleanup Volunteers
2 50
Given EPA's backlog of unassessed contaminated sites,
the much larger number of contaminated industrial and waste
disposal sites that are not on the NPL,25 1 and particularly the
failure of 1993 and 1994 efforts to amend CERCLA, 25 2 numerous states in the last few years have sought to encourage private
voluntary cleanups by creating procedures for government approval of private cleanup plans. These states' schemes differ
2 53
substantially in content and triggering mechanisms.
New Jersey, under the state's Industrial Site Recovery Act
("ISRA"), 2 54 has instituted an administrative initiative under
which it will review and provide "memoranda of agreement" to
250. See supra note 11 (discussing EPA's backlog of unassessed contaminated sites).
251. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing contaminated
sites not on the NPL).
252. See supra notes 235-244 and accompanying text (discussing the failure
of recent efforts to amend CERCLA).
253. See infra notes 254-264 and accompanying text (discussing approval
programs of specific states); Appendix A (summarizing state cleanup approval
programs).
254. N.J.S.A. § 13:1K-6 to -11 (West Supp. 1995) (effective June 16, 1993).
Under the ISRA, the owner or operator of an industrial facility must follow statutory procedure before transfer or closure. Id. The owner or operator must notify the state of the impending action and must either seek approval of
assessment and cleanups or deferral of cleanup until after transfer. Id. The
state verifies completion, and misrepresentation will void the agreement.
Cleanup standards differ for residential and nonresidential uses. Id. In New
Jersey, the first statutory effort to encourage private cleanups of contaminated
properties was the Environment Cleanup and Responsibility Act ("ECRA"). As
initially structured, ECRA utilized a transactional trigger to compel private
analysis of industrial sites and private commitment to remediate contamination. Under a broad definition of change of control or ownership of industrial
real property, any such change triggered a disclosure and analysis obligation.
The parties to such a transaction had to disclose their transaction, undertake
an assessment of potential contamination that was reviewed and approved by
New Jersey authorities, and ultimately commit, through an Administrative
Consent Order ("ACO"), to remedy any contamination. Both the assessment
process and the cleanup plan were reviewed and, after consultation and any
necessary changes, approved by state authorities. Assessment and cleanup in
accordance with approved plans terminated the liabilities of the parties to an
ACO. See generally I. Leo Motiuk et al., New Jersey'sHazardousSite Remediation Program: The Year of Reform, in AvoIDING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
1993: RUNNING THE BusINEss, STRUCTURING THE TRANSACTION, NEGOTIATING
THE DEAL,at 585 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 832,
1993) (explaining ECRA and the 1993 reform, known as ISRA).
Despite ECRA's success in obtaining many commitments to cleanup contaminated industrial properties, the statute was criticized for deterring otherwise beneficial transactions and leading investors to avoid New Jersey real
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private cleanup volunteers. Over 2000 volunteers have availed
themselves of this approval process. 2 55 Cleanup volunteers
receive a "No Further Action" letter from the state when they
complete a cleanup in accordance with their particular "memorandum of agreement."2 56 Developers pay state oversight costs,
but in the event of a remedy failure or unexpected need for further work, a developer who did not cause the contamination has
25 7
recourse to 50% state finding of any additional cleanup costs.
By statute, Indiana in 1993 created a voluntary remediation
program. 2 58 Under this program, private cleanup proponents
seek and receive government approval of cleanup plans.
Cleanup plans must have "defined objective[s] and finite
goal[s]." 2 5 9 When cleanup is completed, the cleanup volunteer
receives a post-cleanup "exoneration" in the form of a governor's
covenant not to sue.2 60 Assuming the cleanup proponent fully
disclosed all relevant conditions, this covenant will bar further
2 61
state and private suits under Indiana hazardous waste laws.
Although the statute does not explicitly resolve what happens in
the event of a remedy failure, it appears that state authorities
would either have to clean up contamination themselves or pursue other responsible parties who were not part of the Voluntary
Remediation Agreement.
New York, Minnesota, and numerous other states are in the
process of implementing administrative and statutory initiaproperty. ECRA was thus substantially revised in 1993 and renamed the Industrial Site Recovery Act ("ISRA").
255. Telephone interview with Douglas Stewart, Bureau Chief of ISRA Program, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (Feb. 10, 1995)
[hereinafter Stewart interview]. None of these sites have required multi-million dollar cleanups, but nothing in this new scheme precludes such a possibility. Id. As of the summer of 1995, approximately 3600 sites are in the program.
See Appendix A, infra (summarizing state initiatives to address voluntary
cleanups).
256. Stewart Interview, supra note 255.
257. Id. Because of New Jersey's enactment of ECRA, which required industrial purchasers or sellers to commit to cleanups of any contamination, purchasers of New Jersey industrial property between 1983 and 1993 are denied
access to cost-sharing with the state for additional necessary cleanup costs.
These volunteers can, however, still receive the limited protection and official
guidance of a Memorandum of Agreement and a No Further Action letter. Id.
258. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9 (Burns 1994) (effective July 1, 1993). Indiana received over two hundred cleanup inquiries and six actual proposals in the
first three months following enactment of the statute. O'Reilly, supra note 12,
at 64.
259. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 57.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 58. Such a covenant does not bar private tort suits. Id. at 66.
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lives (summarized in Appendix A) to encourage voluntary cleanups. These state schemes vary substantially in their scope and
content. 2 62 The majority of cleanups under state programs have
occurred in the transactional context. While few state officials
express desire for federal oversight of such programs, many concede that cleanup volunteers have been concerned with lingering potential federal liability. 263 While state approvals cannot
foreclose such liability, state officials assume that federal respect for federal-state comity and federal attention to only the
most pressing risks will reduce the likelihood of federal intervention after state authorities review and approve voluntary
264
cleanups.
These programs support the hypothesis of Part I: private
parties will seek approval for voluntary cleanups where such approval will provide them with certainty and repose. The substantial response to these states' programs, especially in states
offering substantial finality and repose, indicates pent-up de265
mand for an approval process.
These recent state voluntary cleanup initiatives show a different dynamic at play at the state level than in federal efforts.
State or local officials face many of the same difficulties and
risks faced by federal officials who might review voluntary
cleanup proposals. Scientific uncertainty coupled with possible
government liability for cleanup failures make approval decisions inherently risky. State and local willingness to undertake
such schemes, however, is rational given the particular incentives motivating state and local regulators, especially in states
with an underutilized industrial infrastructure.
State and local regulators can provide substantial political
and economic benefits to their polity by providing regulated entities with certainty and repose. Regulated entities desire such
certainty and repose, and will prefer to site businesses in jurisdictions offering a more certain regulatory environment. 2 66
262. See Appendix A, infra (summarizing state cleanup approval programs).
263. Id.
264. O'Reilly, supra note 13; Stewart interview, supra note 255.
265. See supra notes 36-38, 254-255 and accompanying text (discussing
number of responses to state procedures for approving private cleanup plans);
Appendix A, infra (summarizing state initiatives to address voluntary
cleanups).
266. Despite the preference for a certain political or legal environment, regulated entities' consideration of other variables may trump a decision to site a
facility in the jurisdiction offering certainty regarding environmental obligations and liabilities. See Howard A. Stafford, Environmental Protection and
IndustrialLocation, 75 ANNALs Am. GEOGRAPHERS 227 (1985) (finding, based on
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State and local officials differ from their federal counterparts in
one significant respect: the decision to site a facility on a Brownfield site in a particular state provides tangible benefits to that
state in the form of increased tax revenues, increased employment, increased real property values and real property taxes,
and a physically and environmentally more attractive setting for
local residents and businesses. 26 7 A federal official would be indifferent to such a siting decision, provided the business remained in the United States. Thus, state and local officials have
positive incentives that apparently exceed the administrative
costs and risks of such voluntary cleanup approval programs. It
is unsurprising that Minnesota, Indiana, and New Jersey, states
with substantial numbers of Brownfield sites, have led in creating comprehensive voluntary cleanup programs.
C.

FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT Is STiLL NECESSARY DESPITE STATE
VOLuNTARY CLEANUP APPROVAL INiTIAnVES

The question that remains is whether any federal involvement in voluntary contamination cleanup approvals is necessary. This section concludes that while state and local
implementation of such programs is likely and should be harnessed to further the goal of contamination cleanups, political
dynamics make lax cleanups a risk unless some federal oversight remains. 2 68 Such federal oversight of state voluntary
cleanup approvals enhances the likelihood that cleanup techniques and levels will be appropriate from a scientific and health
perspective. 2 6 9 Providing cleanup approvals that eliminate the
empirical survey, that "manufacturers are asking for clarity and fairness, not a
license to pollute," but also concluding that while private entities consider environmental factors in siting decisions, traditional non-environmental factors
such as markets, labor and materials remain predominant). Stafford also finds
that while a general regulatory climate is considered by industry, site-specific
environmental factors play a much more substantial rule in siting decisions.
Id. at 233-34, 238; see also Ian King et al., IndustrialBlackmail: Dynamic Tax
Competition and Public Investment, 26 CANADIAN J. ECON. 590, 591 (1993)
(modeling dynamics of site-specific interjurisdictional siting battles).
267. See generally NEW LIFE, supra note 12, at 41-49 (detailing successful
efforts to finance the cleanup and development of environmentally damaged industrial sites).
268. As of May, 1995, an EPA draft document indicates new EPA support
for substantial delegation of CERCLA authority to states. DraftIndicatesEPA
ConsideringProposal to Give Oversight, Enforcement to States, 26 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 246, 246-47 (May 26, 1995).
269. That there is an objectively correct level of cleanup is, of course, open to
debate. Professors Richard Revesz and Alvin Klevorick appear to question
whether such a cleanup decision can ever be objectively correct, given the many
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threat of both federal and state-mandated cleanups also would
enhance the likelihood of cleanups and increase property values.
Over the last decade, scholars have debated and analyzed
the merits of federal instead of state-led administration of environmental laws. The first wave of scholarship followed decades
of lax private and state protection of the environment and concluded that federal protection was necessary, based on two primary justifications. 2 70 The first was historical: states had done
little, so federal activity was necessary to protect citizens and
the environment. 27 1 The more frequent rationale was that
states provided lower levels of environmental protection than
actually desired by a state's citizens because of interstate competition for business.2 7 2 This rationale for federal regulation is
usually referred to as the "race-to-the-bottom" or "race-to-laxity"
scenario. The federal government under this theory acts to
fulfill states' true preferences by eliminating harmful
2 73
competition.
Recently, in separate papers, Professors Richard Revesz
and Alvin Klevorick challenge this scenario. Revesz shows that
states forced to adopt federal standards where they would have
variables and tradeoffs in any regulatory decision. Alvin K. Klevorick, Reflections on the Race to the Bottom, Paper presented at 1995 American Association
of Law Schools Conference (Dec. 28, 1994) at 8; Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking The "Race-to-the-Bottom"Rationalefor
FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1245-46 (1992).
270.

See FRANK P. GRAD, ENvIRoNmENTAL LAw 8-10 (3d ed. 1985) (summa-

rizing the history of the federal governments involvement in environmental
regulation following lax state enforcement); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problemsof Federalismin Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-12 (1977) (articulating
arguments for federal intervention and the costs of uniform national policies).
271. GRAD, supra note 270, at 9-10 (noting the failure of grant-in-aid efforts
to ensure state and local enforcement of environmental standards).
272. Stewart, supra note 270, at 1211-12, 1217-19 (detailing factors that
may deter state and local governments from providing high environmental protection). Under this theory, if one state responded to local political pressure for
a safer environment, mobile businesses would relocate tojurisdictions offering a
less rigorous and less costly regulatory environment. Id. Through a process of
regulatory competition, no state would protect its environment to the extent
actually preferred in the absence of the interjurisdictional competition. Id.
273. See Revesz, supra note 269, at 1213-18 (summarizing the race-to-thebottom scenario). Inteijurisdictional competition for business is well documented. See, e.g., Vicld Been, 'Exit" As a Constrainton Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUm. L. REv. 473,
512-15 (1991) (citing and discussing news and scholarly articles regarding interjurisdictional competition for business); see also infra note 283 and accompanying text (detailing competition among communities for business and
industry).
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chosen less protective standards will generally be forced to compensate by reducing other regulatory protections to remain competitive in attracting business. 27 4 Revesz also argues that given
different states' preferences for varying degrees of environmental protection, a uniform federal standard can lead some states
to be worse off overall, considering all of their regulatory choices,
than in the absence of a federal standard. 2 75 Nevertheless,
neither Revesz nor Klevorick disputes that a race to the bottom
resulting in lowered standards of environmental protection
sometimes occurs; instead, they argue against taking away
states' power over their own regulatory priorities based on a
27 6
race-to-the-bottom rationale.
Revesz and Klevorick, while questioning the validity of the
race-to-the-bottom justification for federal regulation, leave unresolved whether different political dynamics at the state and
federal level might nonetheless in particular contexts lead one to
favor a federally imposed standard over state choice. 2 7 7 This Article argues that such a comparison of state and federal political
274. Revesz, supra note 269, at 1226-27, 1245-46. Revesz does not, however, argue that a polity cannot remove an issue from interjurisdictional bargaining. Such a decision might cause ripple effects for other regulatory and tax
choices, but that impact does not undercut the political option of a majority of
national legislators imposing a federal rule on all states, provided such a choice
is within the authority of the federal government. See United States v. Lopez,
No. 93-1260, 1995 WL 238424 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1995) (striking down federal regulation of gun-free zones near schools on grounds of insufficient proof of an interstate commerce nexus).
275. Id. at 1211, 1229-33. Revesz argues further that states competing for
business would have to modify their mix of regulatory amenities if subjected to
a uniform federal rule, and might have to sacrifice areas valued more by state
citizens. Id. at 1245-47.
276. Revesz argues that allowing interjurisdictional competition and state
regulatory discretion "can be expected to produce an effective allocation of industrial activity among the states." Id. at 1212. He concedes a race to the bottom will sometimes occur. Id. at 1231-32. See Klevorick, supra note 269, at 712 (reviewing arguments regarding benefits and harms of uniform federal
standards).
277. See Revesz, supra note 269, at 1223 (arguing that race-to-the-bottom
arguments are distinct from "public choice" arguments that "political processes
at the state level undervalue environmental benefits"). Professor Klevorick's
statement of this point differs slightly, asserting that in the end, any justification for federal over state regulation must be rooted in an argument that there
are "shortcomings in the internal political systems" of the competing jurisdictions. Klevorick, supra note 269, at 15. He says such a justification requires
one to examine the argument "for uniformity... at the level of the decisionmaking process.... If the process is flawed, if relevant information is not considered or if particular views are deliberately ignored, then an argument can be
made that the government is intentionally tilting the playing field." Id. at 1314.
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dynamics is essential to decide how to allocate implementation
responsibilities for a CAP scheme. Given a national political
goal of cleaning contaminated sites at PRP expense, legislators
seeking to reach that goal must consider the particular preferences and incentives of local and federal officials in connection
with contamination cleanups and siting decisions.
As shown above, state or local governments are more likely
to create such programs because of localized benefits that do not
accrue to federal regulators. Scholars of political dysfunction,
however, have shown how interest group pressures exerted on
officials by regulated entities can lead to decisions more likely to
reflect not the "public good," but concentrated interest group
desires. 27 8 Industrial pollution sources or businesses making
siting decisions involving contaminated sites have substantial
incentives to participate politically, while the many citizens
bearing widely dispersed costs of polluting activity or inadequate cleanups have far weaker incentives to act collectively and
participate in the consent decree or administrative cleanup approval process. 27 9 Those citizens' views, even if widely shared,
may simply go unheard. At the federal level, some reason exists
to believe that dispersed citizen voices will be heard. National
environmental groups such as the Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund are most active at the federal level. 280 To at
least a limited extent, such groups may counteract political dys278. See Becker, supra note 157, at 375 (concluding that "groups can more
readily obtain subsidies when they are small relative to the number of
taxpayers").
279. See MNCUR OLSON, THE LoGic OF COLLECTrVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 28-29 (1971) (arguing that small groups with common interests tend to more effectively achieve shared goals than large groups
lacking a mechanism to coerce them to act collectively); James E. Krier, The
Tragedy of the Commons, PartTwo, 15 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 325,331 (1992)
("[Groups interested in disrupting the environment generally have a comparative organizational or lobbying advantage over groups interested in preserving
it."); Stewart, supra note 270, at 1213-14 (arguing that interests favoring economic development are usually better represented than those favoring environmental quality); William Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in
the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities 25-26 (1973) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University) (in developing empirical and modeling analysis of siting decisions, citing sources observing a substantial reduction in citizen interest in sources of pollution once surveyors move a few blocks from
polluting source).
280. See Robert E. Taylor, Group's Influence on U.S. EnvironmentalLaws,
PoliciesEarns it a Reputation as a Shadow EPA, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1986, at
50 (discussing role of Natural Resources Defense Council in development of federal environmental policy).
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function by giving voice to citizens' widely but weakly held preferences for environmental protection and may counteract
caused by unequal access to the political
political dysfunction
28 1
process.
Lax approvals by local officials are also a risk because of the
particular incentives of such officials. The environmental regulatory climate is a minor factor for industry decisionmakers comparing jurisdictions, with wage and location playing a much
more significant role. 28 2 When it comes to actual siting deci-

sions, however, the regulatory or environmental risks a particular site poses are significant factors for industry. Even if
industry may not actually make decisions based on environmental factors, local officials feel pressure to attract or at least not
lose business to neighboring jurisdictions. 2 83 While environmental protection is one of the values voters consider, low tax
rates, sufficient tax revenues to satisfy the electorate's desire for
government services and crime protection, and high levels of employment also remain important measures of political success.2 84 Local officials who fail to play what few cards they have

to attract or retain industry do so at their political peril.
Low-cost contamination cleanups are a tempting card for
such officials. This option is especially attractive because the
possible risks of lax cleanups are difficult to prove and may only
281. See Revesz, supra note 269, at 1223-24 & nn.36-37 (noting that environmental groups may be more effective at the federal level); Stewart, supra
note 270, at 1213-15 (noting the advantages for environmental groups that advocate on the national instead of the local level).
282. See Timothy J. Bartik, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on
Business Location in the United States, GROWTH AND CHANGE, Summer 1988, at
22, 37 (finding no statistically significant effects of environmental regulation on
business location); Virginia D. McConnell & Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of
Environmental Regulation on Industry Location Decisions: The Motor Vehicle
Industry, 66 LAND ECON. 67, 79 (1990) (finding that environmental regulatory
environment played a mixed or minor role in siting decisions of motor vehicle
industry).
283. Been, supra note 273, at 512-14; King, supra note 266, at 590-91 (noting recent firm-specific incentive packages); Fischel, supra note 279, at 18-20;
see also Thomas J. Lueck, Lower Budgets Don't Cut Flow of Tax Breaks; Businesses Get Millions to Stay in New York, N.Y. Tnms, July 5, 1995, at Al (discussing the grant of substantial tax breaks to businesses that stay in New York
despite the city's fiscal straits and substantial cuts in education and social services, but also describing other jurisdictions' dwindling enthusiasm for further
tax breaks to attract business).
284. See Riley E. Dunlap & Rik Scarce, Trends: Environmental Problems
and Protection, 55 Pus. OpmoN Q. 651, 653, 668 (1991) (reporting 47% of respondents, with 13% percent undecided, would accept a higher rate of unemployment so industry could better protect the environment, but noting the
importance of other traditional factors).
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materialize years later, if ever. In contrast, the other main variable that can be manipulated by local officials, tax breaks for
industry, will create a more immediately felt (although dispersed) burden when offset by tax increases. Federal officials
would generally be indifferent to interjurisdictional competitive
2 85
pressures.
An additional benefit of federal oversight is a simple reviewing or checking function. Even if state or local officials try to
make appropriate cleanup decisions, additional federal review
would reduce the chance of error going unremedied. From the
volunteer's viewpoint, complete closure of potential liability
from both state and federal governments would be reassuring
and encourage voluntary cleanups.
These explanations for why federal political processes are
less likely to dysfunction than state processes seem much like
the traditional "race-to-the-bottom" scenario, but are in fact different. In the "race-to-the-bottom" scenario, states know their
true political preferences, but interstate competition forces
states to disregard them. The political dysfunction explanation
instead focuses on the process by which officials ascertain political preferences and ultimately act on them. The skewing of local political choices caused by concentrated pressure on local
officials by parties interested in a particular cleanup and threatening to go elsewhere is absent at the federal level. As noted
above, the participation of national environmental groups at the
federal level also increases the likelihood of voice being given to
citizen concerns. The question at the federal level is more likely
to be what level of cleanup is sufficiently protective of public
health and the environment. Nevertheless, federal flexibility
and deference to allow states some latitude to choose cleanup
levels and methods is appropriate, given the different economic
and environmental preferences of the various state and local
governments.
To ensure adequately protective cleanups, threshold federal
approval of state voluntary cleanup approval programs involving substantial cleanups should be required, with possible federal appellate review of challenged state cleanup decisions. In

285. Even at the federal level, the threat of location abroad remains a concern, especially after the recent enactment of the North American Free Trade
Agreement. The number of relocation threats, however, are fewer at the federal
level. State officials confront threats both of industrial migration abroad and
to other jurisdictions within the United States.
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addition, where states choose not to implement CAP schemes,
6
the federal government should itself provide CAP approvals. 28
CONCLUSION
The current CERCLA and RCRA schemes fail to encourage
voluntary cleanups of contaminated sites, thereby contributing
to abandonment of industrial infrastructure and continued exposure to risks from contaminants. The explanation for this failure is found both in relevant statutory instructions and in
bureaucratic preferences and incentives. Congress failed to anticipate the preferences and incentives of agency officials and of
regulated entities and to modify the statutory schemes accordingly. Contrary to the common hypothesis that agencies will
seize opportunities to expand, however, EPA resisted expanding
its activities to provide guidance to cleanup volunteers. Other
factors particular to the adjudicatory task of reviewing cleanup
proposals overcame any possible general bureaucratic propensities to expand an agency's budget and regulatory domain.
Congress or EPA should create a CAP scheme to further
statutory goals by encouraging voluntary cleanups. A CAP
scheme would offer substantial finality and repose to cleanup
volunteers, and would provide benefits to the government, regulated entities, and society as a whole. Such a scheme would also
address jurisprudential objections to the current regulatory
schemes. Administration of a CAP scheme should be offered to
states, which have shown greater interest in providing such a
service than has the federal government and which also most
directly receive the benefits of industrial site cleanups. The federal government should remain involved by providing review of
286. One reader of an early draft of this Article posited that states might
surrender CAP implementation if the federal government were willing to bear
this obligation. Such surrender is rational if a state wished to avoid new administrative obligations. However, if states can avoid budgetary depletion
through a fee system or charge for oversight costs, state agencies might seek
programmatic expansion. See supra notes 160-208 and accompanying text (discussing budgetary expansion hypothesis but questioning the sufficiency of the
hypothesis in light of other factors also considered by agency officials). Furthermore, under other environmental statutory schemes such as the Clean Air Act
and RCRA, states have fought hard to retain implementation responsibilities.
States generally avoid taking over contentious and politically risky "dredge and
fill" decisions under the Clean Water Act. While state behavior is difficult to
predict, as long as states have some latitude to implement a CAP scheme, with
some deference given by EPA officials acting as appellate reviewers of disputed
cleanup decisions, then states should still seek to retain CAP obligations. Legislation allowing states with approved CAP schemes to receive Superfund dollars would especially encourage state implementation of approval programs.
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state CAP schemes, appellate review of disputed cleanup decisions, and an alternative federal approval process if a state declines to create such a program. The current federal regulatory
schemes' broad liabilities have beneficial impacts, but the interminable nature of those liabilities deters voluntary contamination cleanups and violates jurisprudential notions that law
should be discoverable, or at least offer those regulated the possibility of repose.
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